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Letter from the Editors
Dear Reader,
After two semesters, the challenges of a global pandemic, and a university-wide transition to online learning, we are proud to
present Volume Seven of the James Madison Undergraduate Research Journal!
During the 2019-2020 academic year, Managing Editor Logan Roddy led a dedicated crew of interns, editors, and designers
in publishing the first installments of Volume 7. In the Fall 2020 semester, Managing Editors Kim Stuart and Jennifer Switzer
took up the mantle of leadership, working with a team of newcomers and experienced returners to deliver the finishing
touches on our volume and lay the groundwork for future editorial boards.
The transition to managing the publication in an entirely digital space proved to be a new adventure for us all, but the
Editorial Board has maintained its momentum. This volume represents research from a variety of disciplines, including
Political Science, History, Sociology, and Integrated Science and Technology. These works, along with pieces published in
previous volumes, have been downloaded over 32,000 times in the past year by researchers around the world. As our journal
continues to grow in scope, we have continued to value the support of 200+ faculty experts across the JMU campus who have
served as reviewers since our first issue.
Volume 7 stands as a testament to the ways that James Madison University as a whole adapts and achieves academic excellence.
JMURJ is proud to have provided undergraduate students with a platform to showcase their research and scholarship to their
peers around the globe. This would not be possible without the community we have developed, both within James Madison
University and beyond. Whether you are a long-time supporter or a first-time reader, we thank you for your patronage and
hope you enjoy the valuable research and scholarship created by JMU’s undergraduate students.
The JMURJ Editorial Board

Meet the Board
Managing Editors
Logan Roddy
Kimberlyn Stuart
Jennifer Switzer
Lead Editors
Laura Baird
Kenny Graham
Sarah Hann
Tess Myracle
Jessica Tosi
Webmaster
Zach Welker

4

Editors
Leah Coffey
Aleah Crystal
Nick Dunard
Lindsay Faules
Taralyn Guthrie
Sarah Hann
Jay White
Designers
Tori Carpenter
Homer Eliades
Declan Sofield

Marketing Team
Isabelle Amato
Angela Lin
Sara M.
Clara Peirce
Rochelle Podolsky
ISAT Liaison
Nolan Harrington
Advisor
Kevin Jefferson

Volume Seven Faculty Reviewers
Dr. Melinda Adams, Political Science
Dr. Jessica Adolino, Political Science
Professor Kate Arecchi, Theatre and Dance
Dr. Stephanie Baller, Health Sciences
Professor Rodolfo Barrett, Learning Centers
Dr. Sarah Brooks, Art, Design and Art History
Dr. Martin Cohen, Political Science
Dr. Erika Collazo, Health Sciences
Dr. Andrew Connell, Music
Dr. Kerry F. Crawford, Political Science
Dr. David Dillard, History
Dr. David Ehrenpreis, Art, Design and Art History
Dr. Samy Sayed El-Tawab, Integrated Science and Technology
Dr. Theresa M. Enyeart Smith, Health Sciences
Professor Jared Featherstone, Learning Centers
Dr. Dolores Flamiano, Media Arts and Design
Dr. Louise Gilchrist, Pre-PT/Pre-OT Advisor
Dr. Keith Grant, Political Science
Dr. Steven Guerrier, History
Dr. Maura Hametz, History
Dr. Shah Mahmoud Hanifi, History
Dr. Glenn P. Hastedt, Justice Studies
Dr. Yongguang Hu, History
Dr. Aimee Johnson, Health Sciences

Dr. David Jones, Political Science
Dr. Gabrielle M. Lanier, History
Dr. Claire Lyons, Psychology
Dr. Lisa McGuire, Social Work
Dr. Benjamin Meade, Justice Studies
Dr. Shana Meganck, Political Science
Dr. Talé Mitchell, Media Arts and Design
Dr. Yenisei Montes de Oca, Foreign Languages,
Literatures, and Cultures
Dr. Colleen Moore, History
Dr. Ji Hyung Park, Political Science
Dr. Joshua Pate, Hospitality, Sport and Recreation Management
Dr. Jenny Ramirez, Art History
Dr. Tomás Regalado-López, Foreign Languages,
Literatures, and Cultures
Dr. Sharlene Richards, Communication Studies
Dr. Bryan Saville, Psychology
Professor Joshua Streeter, Theatre and Dance
Dr. Jeffrey Tang, Integrated Science and Technology
Dr. John Tkac, Foreign Languages, Literatures, and Cultures
Dr. Laura Trull, Social Work
Dr. Tim Walton, Intelligence Analysis
Dr. Maria Theresa Wessel, Health Sciences

Acknowledgments
We thank the 200+ faculty reviewers who have volunteered their time through the first seven volumes of JMURJ, starting
with the 45 faculty reviewers listed above who reviewed for Volume 7. Traci Zimmerman and Michael Smith, past and
current Directors of the School of Writing, Rhetoric and Technical Communication, remain enduring champions for JMURJ.
We also want to acknowledge Vice Provosts Keith Holland and Anthony Tongen, Ms. Becky Rohlf, and Mr. Ben Delp in
the Office of Research and Scholarship for their assistance. We thank JMU Creative Media for their contributions to our
publication. We have also enjoyed ongoing technical support from WRTC’s Sandra Purington and Kristin Knapp and the
Learning Centers’ Joan Fahrney and Adrienne Griggs. Finally, we would again like to thank President Jonathan Alger and
Provost Heather Coltman for their interest and encouragement as we work to promote, publish, and share undergraduate
research and scholarship throughout the JMU community.

James Madison Undergraduate Research Journal

5

The Russo-Japanese War
Origins and Implications

Benjamin Mainardi

The 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese War was the first major conflict of the twentieth century and a turning point in
the balance of power in East Asia. In the short term, Russia’s defeat helped precipitate the 1905 Russian Revolution
and the 1917 October Revolution. More broadly, the aftermath of the war informed Japan’s imperial ambitions in
Manchuria—the early stages of World War II in Asia during the 1930s—and continuing Russo-Japanese enmity
over Sakhalin Island and the Kuril Island chain. Studying this historical conflict in terms of international relations
provides valuable insights into the nature of the conflict and how the past continues to shape modern geopolitics.
As a case study, the war offers important lessons in the difficulties of sustained power projection and the exigencies
involved in adaptable war planning. Equally important, Russia and Japan’s intractable imperial ambitions coupled
with their failures to credibly communicate resolve serve as a cautionary tale on the consequences of inept
diplomacy.
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Throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
European great powers carved out spheres of influence in
East Asia. As available territory became limited, empires
seeking to expand competed against one another. While
contemporaries widely regarded Russia as the dominant
force in East Asia, Japanese power was rapidly growing.
Both powers preyed on the ailing Qing dynasty of China.
Russia steadily eroded Chinese territory in the north while
Japan waged war with China for control of Korea. Sustained
Russian power projection in the East necessitated access
to a warm-water port. This was found at Port Arthur on
the strategic Liaodong Peninsula just north of the Korean
border. By the late 1890s, Russia and Japan were at odds
over territorial ambitions in this region. Russian presence
gradually intensified in Manchuria and began encroaching
on Korea in spite of Korea’s position within Japan’s sphere
of influence.

The resulting contest for
domination of East Asia would
become the first major armed
conflict of the twentieth century.
As this emerging security dilemma began to jeopardize
Japan’s foothold on the Asian mainland, tensions between
Russia and Japan escalated. Unable to reach an agreeable
status quo while neglecting to fully indicate its resolve on
the issue of Korea, Japan prepared for conflict. In February
1904, breaching international etiquette established by
the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, the Imperial
Japanese Navy launched a surprise strike against the Russian
Pacific Fleet at Port Arthur prior to officially declaring war
(Aldrich 2000). The resulting contest for domination of East
Asia would become the first major armed conflict of the
twentieth century. Examining this archetypal case study in
regional power transition reveals the perils of intractability
and sustained power projection.

Historical Background
Understanding the origins of the Russo-Japanese War first
necessitates an understanding of contemporary East Asian
geopolitics. For nearly three thousand years, various Chinese
imperial dynasties had been the regional superpowers of
East Asia with few peer competitors. Historians largely agree
that this lack of true peer-competition led to military and
industrial stagnation in the later Qing dynasty (Naquin
1987, 219-221). From 1644 to at least 1800, the dynasty
was the unquestioned hegemon of East Asia. Yet by 1800,

Western powers began encroaching on Chinese client-states
and spheres of influence. Portugal had solidified its hold on
the once Chinese-held port city of Macau, and the Dutch
fostered an ever-growing presence in Taiwan and much of
modern Indonesia. Meanwhile, Spain maintained control of
the Philippine Islands, the British presence in India was slowly
permeating throughout Southeast Asia, and friction along
the Chinese northern border with Russia was intensifying
(Zhao 1998, 26). However, the Chinese-led international
order of East and Southeast Asia established by the Tributary
and Guangzhou Systems persisted (Zhao 1998, 25).
Largely dissatisfied with these regional systems in which
the Qing dynasty dominated virtually all political and
economic affairs, European states gradually began to erode
Chinese influence in the region. As such, the power of East
Asia’s traditional hegemony was supplanted throughout the
nineteenth century, rupturing the unipolar order without a
sufficiently powerful state to replace China. Russia and Great
Britain, in particular, heavily shaped the regional dynamics
of East Asia during the late eighteenth century. Frustrated by
an inability to expand in the Balkans, Crimea, or Southwest
Asia in the first half of the eighteenth century, Russia began
to look eastward. It progressively occupied greater portions
of eastern Siberia and northern Mongolia, creating tensions
with China (Malozemoff 1958, 19-23). Great Britain desired
ever-greater trading rights with the Qing dynasty and
eventually exacted its economic ambitions through a series of
conflicts known as the Opium Wars. By 1898, Great Britain,
France, Germany, and Russia all held de facto control over
large portions of the Chinese mainland (MacNair and Lach
1950, 53).
At the same time, Japan was emerging from nearly two
centuries of self-imposed isolation under the recently
overthrown Tokugawa Shogunate. The new Meiji government
recognized that nations not poised for offense were likely to
be dominated by those that were. After observing the gradual
erosion of Chinese territory by the West and being subjected
to unequal trade treaties, the Meiji government’s chief priority
was modernizing Japan’s industry and military. Prior to
1850, however, Japan’s economy was still primarily based on
subsistence agriculture; military technological development
had largely stagnated since the founding of the Tokugawa
regime in 1603 (Tuan-Hwee and Moriguchi 2014, 464).
Extraordinarily, the Meiji government was able to modernize
effectively using Japan’s existing political infrastructure and
posture as a great power. Still, to truly accede to great power
status, Japan needed to expand territorially as the others had.
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Soon after Western powers began forcing Japan to
normalize its foreign relations in 1853, Japanese leaders
sought to expand their fledgling empire. The logical first
step towards expansion onto the Asian mainland was the
takeover of the Korean Peninsula. However, Korea had
traditionally been a Chinese vassal-state, and despite the
Western powers eroding its influence, the Qing dynasty
had been able to maintain effective control. In 1876, Japan
forced the Korean kingdom of Joseon into an unequal
trade treaty in spite of Chinese objections.

This expanding Russian sphere
of influence began to directly
conflict with Japanese interests.
Continued Japanese efforts to assert itself into Korean
politics heightened tensions in Sino-Japanese relations
Yet after China and Japan signed the peace treaty, the
terms were forcibly altered by the Tripartite Intervention
of Russia, Germany, and France, ostensibly to maintain
the stability of East Asia. Russia was the primary agent
behind the intervention; it sought both to assert its own
influence in East Asia and to secure its borders along
Manchuria against the seemingly powerful China, as
evidenced by the construction of the Trans-Siberian
Railway (Malozemoff 1958, 27). Russia particularly
objected to the Japanese acquisition of the harbor city of
Port Arthur since it hoped to establish it as its own warmwater port in the East (Kowner 2006, 375). Japan agreed
to altered terms of peace in the face of the three great
powers, whose combined naval capabilities outmatched
Japan’s.1 The terms imposed by the Tripartite Intervention
prevented Japan from acquiring the Liaodong Peninsula
and Port Arthur in exchange for an additional 30 million
taels of silver to be paid by China. This intervention by
the Russian diplomatic coalition humiliated Japan and
created a deep sense of suspicion towards the Russians.
In turn, Japan began further investing in its machine
industry and military while also signing an alliance with
Great Britain to counterbalance Russia (Burton 1990,
100).
Japanese suspicions were confirmed when Russian forces
occupied Port Arthur and the Liaodong Peninsula in
1898. Following the fortification of Port Arthur, Russia
1 Kowner’s Historical Dictionary of the Russo-Japanese War, 375 records the
local naval power disparity during the 1895 intervention as being thirty-eight
allied Russian, French, and German warships with a displacement of 95,000 tons
compared to thirty-one Japanese warships with a displacement of 57,000 tons.
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progressively began encroaching on both China and
Korea, gaining a number of economic concessions. This
expanding Russian sphere of influence began to directly
conflict with Japanese interests. Should Japan not have
contested Russia’s rising power, the island nation itself
would have been cut off from expansion onto the Asian
mainland. As such, Japanese leaders became increasingly
convinced conflict with Russia was necessary (Zhang
1998, 53). Similarly, Russia was apt to resist Japan’s
rising power because reducing efforts to supplant China
as the hegemon of East Asia was counter to its interests
and investment in eastern territories. The breaking point
came when, in spite of their assurances they would not do
so, Russian forces continued to occupy the Chinese region
of Manchuria and initiated the construction of railways
connecting the region to its territory after the suppression
of the Boxer Rebellion in 1901 (Katō 2007, 101).2
Entering negotiations over these actions, Japan sought
to establish a status quo whereby Russia acknowledged
its control of Korea and Japan acknowledged Russian
control of Manchuria. When this proposal was rebuffed,
Japan understood that Russian actions indicated an even
greater desire for eastern territory. Another attempt at
negotiations to demilitarize the area also failed as the
lack of trust between the two states and concern over
the emerging security dilemma thwarted compromise
(Malozemoff 1958, 246). Thus, Japan would need to check
Russian expansion by force if it was to expand.

Capabilities and Strategies
On the eve of war in 1904, there was a great disparity in
potential capabilities between Russia and Japan. The 1904
total population of Russia was roughly 125,000,000 whereas
Japan possessed a population of only 67,273,000 (Keltie
1904, 1022-92; 855-75). This massive population difference
was equally present in military personnel. Pre-war Russian
military strength was approximately 1,160,000 men while
Japanese forces only numbered 218,000 (Sarkees and
Wayman 2010). Furthermore, the Russian navy possessed
sixty-four warships while the Japanese navy only totaled
thirty-four (Sarkees and Wayman 2010). And while Japanese
military expenditures in 1904 far outstripped Russia’s, US
$89.5 million to US $66.9 million (Sarkees and Wayman
2010). Russia exceeded Japan in industrial production.
2 The Boxer Rebellion was a reactionary uprising in Chinese society in the face of
increasing Westernization. Between 1899 and 1901, to expel foreign influence from
China, Boxer rebels and Chinese imperial forces engaged the Eight-Nation Alliance
that included Austria-Hungary, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia,
and the United States. The conflict resulted in a decisive victory for the colonial
powers, but marked a general decline in direct intervention in China save for Japan,
Russia, and the United States. For more information on the Boxer Rebellion, see
Silbey, The Boxer Rebellion; Esherick, Origins; or Bickers, The Scramble for China.
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Russia produced 2,766,000 tons of iron and steel annually
as of 1904 while Japan produced only 60,000 tons (Sarkees
and Wayman 2010). Overall, the Correlates of War Project
scored Japan’s 1904 composite national capability as 0.0545
and Russia’s as 0.1132 (Sarkees and Wayman 2010).3 This
scoring represents that in 1904, Japan possessed 5.45 percent
of world material capabilities while Russia accounted for
11.32 percent.
While Japan was certainly outmatched by Russian material
capabilities, its greatest advantage was geography. At its
shortest distance from the home island of Kyushu, Japan
was positioned approximately one hundred miles away from
the Korean Peninsula (Cooling 1994, 455). In contrast, the
distance by rail from Moscow to Port Arthur was almost five
thousand miles (Asakawa 1904, 64). Complicating the issue
posed by this vast distance was the fact that the Trans-Siberian
Railway had only one track and was not yet fully completed.
This created an inherent operational disadvantage which was
further compounded by the concentration of Russian ground
forces in Eastern Europe and Southwest Asia. As such, Japan’s
army was able to face Russian forces with relative parity in
numbers. Similarly, almost two-thirds of Russian warships
were located in either the Black Sea or the Baltic Sea. Russia’s
Pacific Fleet was also divided between the recently acquired
Port Arthur and the traditional eastern base of Vladivostok.
Any Russian reinforcements would have to travel by ship
and sail around the Cape of Good Hope, a voyage of several
weeks (Koda 2005, 22). Equally devastating to Russian
field capabilities was the lack of an efficient communication
network that reached East Asia.

This unstable foundation for
military operations represented
a failure in Russia’s grand
strategy.
Military strategist Carl von Clausewitz emphasized the
necessity of focusing on the enemy’s center of gravity (von
Clausewitz [1832] 2004, 687). This was Japan’s second
greatest advantage, as Russia had virtually no capability to
both protect its recent gains in Manchuria and also strike
mainland Japan. Its forces were limited in tactical mobility
and had to maintain a responsive posture to Japanese
movements. Furthermore, since Russia would largely be
3 The Correlates of War Project is an academic effort to analyze and study the
facets of conflict since 1816. Correlates of War datasets incorporate a number of
variables that factor into national military and industrial capabilities using quantitative data. For more information, see correlatesofwar.org.

unable to resupply or communicate with its eastern forces
by land, any concerted campaigns would require substantial
planning. Thus, Japanese war planners were able to exercise
more freedom in the campaigns. What resulted was a
strategy of denial and targeted operations. First, destroying
the Russian Pacific Fleet would cripple Russian mobility
and constrict supply lines (Westwood 1986, 38). Second,
campaigns undertaken with naval superiority in specific zones
of operation would give Japanese land forces the tactical edge
needed to overcome Russian numbers (Westwood 1986, 52).
In contrast, Russia’s eastward expansion severely hampered
its logistical capabilities, since it lacked proper lines of
communication and transportation from the industrial
heartland. Such expansion almost completely drained
Russia’s financial reserves, leaving the country dependent on
borrowing large sums from France and Germany (Hunter
1993, 146).
Overall, this unstable foundation for military operations
represented a failure in Russia’s grand strategy. Conversely,
Japan’s grand strategy was distinctly more calculated.
Japan followed the British example and focused on naval
development, constructing the fourth strongest fleet in the
world by 1902 (Evans and Peattie 2012, 89). As such, Japan
was able to effectively transport forces to the Asian mainland
with greater ease than any other contemporary great power.
Furthermore, Japanese efforts to gain support from foreign
powers in the form of loans would eventually account for
almost 40 percent of its wartime expenditure (Hunter 1993,
151).
In contrast, modern observers generally find Russian
preparations for conflict in the East against Japan surprisingly
lackluster. These plans were predicated on the notion that
Japan would never be the instigating power (Jukes 2002,
18). In fact, Russian Viceroy of the Far Eastern Fleet Admiral
Alekseev expressed an overwhelming confidence in Russian
military dominance declaring in 1903 that “our plan of
operations should be based on the assumption that it is
impossible for our fleet to be beaten, taking into consideration
the present relationship of the two fleets, and that a Japanese
landing is impracticable” (Westwood 1986, 37). Yet such
a cursory look at Russian strategy in the East neglects the
realities of being the world’s largest land power. As Nicholas
Papastratigakis (2011) observed in Russian Imperialism and
Naval Power: Military Strategy and the Build-Up to the RussoJapanese War, the Russian military apparatus faced no less
than three major theaters of operations of which the Pacific
had been deemed the least precarious. The Baltic Sea and the
Black Sea, positioned significantly closer to the capital at St.
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Petersburg and Russia’s industrial heartland, both presented
theaters with greater numbers of rivals that appeared to pose
a more significant threat to Russia’s national security. As a
result, the protection of Russia’s holdings in the East would
rely primarily on defensive naval positioning to prevent
landings close to Port Arthur, forcing the Japanese into a
ground war in which vast territories and superior Russian
numbers could exhaust the small island nation (Patrikeef
and Shukman 2007, 56). Indeed, in his book on the Russian
army prior to and during the war with Japan, Commander
in Chief Aleksey Nikolaevich Kuropatkin noted that the
Japanese navy outnumbered Russian naval strength in the
region, relegating the Far Eastern Fleet to a tool of deterrence
and his ground forces to defensive operations (Kuropatkin
1909, 27). Kuropatkin therefore argued that his elastic line
of defense had allowed troop concentrations to retire when
pressed and nearby garrisons to flank and attack Japanese
forces (Kuropatkin 1909, 28).

Resolution and Aftermath
Successive Japanese victories throughout 1904 shocked the
Russian regime, but Russia was ultimately unwilling to sue
for peace. This unwillingness to accede to proposed Japanese
terms for peace was in large part due to the influence of Tsar
Nicholas II’s concern for prestige, but also because the vast
majority of Russian land forces remained intact (Westwood
1986, 157). Regardless, the war progressively evolved into
a stalemate following the Japanese capture of the Liaodong
Peninsula. Declining offers for an early armistice, Tsar
Nicholas II sent the majority of Russia’s Baltic Fleet eastward
in late 1904 via the Cape of Good Hope. This relief force
was decisively defeated in the 1905 Battle of Tsushima. In
the battle, Russia lost eleven battleships, four cruisers, six
destroyers, and twenty-seven auxiliary ships while Japan
lost only three torpedo boats (Regan 1992, 178). Again, in
spite of severe losses, Tsar Nicholas II wanted to escalate the
conflict, but rising domestic tensions coupled with Russian
revolutionary gains forced him to enter into negotiations in
August of 1905 (Connaughton 1992, 342).4 Concurrently,
Japanese losses on land had been mounting, and leaders
contacted President Theodore Roosevelt to help mediate a
peace agreement (Connaughton 1992, 272). In its entirety,
the Russo-Japanese War lasted from February 8, 1904 to
September 5, 1905. Over the course of nineteen months,
roughly 2.5 million men had been mobilized and upwards
4 Beginning in January of 1905, massed socio-political protests emerged in much
of Russia largely due to severe social and economic inequality as well as a growing
discontent with the Russo-Japanese War. Much of the unrest was suppressed using
military force as typified by “Bloody Sunday,” but the disruptions caused by the
revolution were severe. For more information about the 1905 revolution see Salisbury,
Black Night, White Snow; Ascher, Revolution of 1905; or Surh, 1905 in St. Petersburg.
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of two hundred thousand were killed or wounded in action
(Dumas and Vedel-Peterson 1923, 57-9).

The zero-sum nature of the Treaty
of Portsmouth would perpetuate
strained relations between the
two states.
Even after agreeing to enter into negotiations to end the
conflict, Russia and Japan hotly contested the negotiation
planning in an effort to save some level of prestige (Trani
1969, 62). Delegates on both sides took stark positional
approaches centered around territorial changes. Ultimately,
the Treaty of Portsmouth was signed on September 5, 1905. It
stipulated that Russia must recognize Korea as part of Japan’s
sphere of influence and establish exclusive Japanese control
over Korea (“Text of the Treaty of Portsmouth,” 1905).
Further, Russia was required to withdraw from Manchuria,
cede the southern portion of Sakhalin Island, and transfer
the leasing rights of Port Arthur and the Liaodong Peninsula
to Japan (“Text of the Treaty of Portsmouth,” 1905). Yet
this resolution failed to address the underlying issues of
conflicting Japanese and Russian interests in the region.
Russia had been denied access to a significant warm-water
port and lost control of part of its homeland, the southern
half of Sakhalin Island, which ultimately curtailed eastward
expansion. The zero-sum nature of the Treaty of Portsmouth
would perpetuate strained relations between the two states
that continued through the decline of the Russian Empire in
1917 and into the Soviet period.
Japan’s decisive victory crippled Russian international prestige
and power projection capability. Additionally, the substantial
loss of face by the Russian regime contributed to the rise of the
1905 Russian Revolution and the 1917 October Revolution.
In crippling Russia, whether intentionally or not, Japan
had effectively removed its sole rival in East Asia while also
gaining large portions of territory. Yet victory came at a cost
of a forty-fold increase in the national debt with an annual
interest accounting for roughly a quarter of the Japanese
budget (Oyama and Ogawa 1932, 252). In turn, East Asia’s
new hegemon began developing a regional system of direct
political and economic imperialism that would come to be
known as the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

Theoretical Explanation
Due to the decline of Chinese power, the East Asian region
lost its hegemony that had guaranteed international stability
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for centuries. The ensuing power vacuum evolved into a semimultipolar system whereby major European states effectively
divided East Asia among themselves. It should be noted that
Britain and Russia were distinctly more able to project power
to the region. However, Britain primarily sought to further
economic ties while Russia sought actual territorial gains and
the assertion of its own rule. By the end of the nineteenth
century, the only two states that possessed significant forces
in the region were Japan and Russia. Despite both actors
cooperating in the suppression of the 1900 Boxer Rebellion
and engaging in some trading enterprises, this dyad was
ultimately unable to establish a status quo suitable to both
parties.
This inability to compromise on delineating spheres of
influence was largely due to the overwhelming expansionary
ambitions of both states. Progressively, Russia attempted to
fill the power vacuum left by China’s decline through a series
of territorial expansions and treaties with the ailing Qing
dynasty. Japan, however, was dissatisfied with the emerging
Russian supremacy in East Asia (Zhao 1998, 52). Yet when
accounting for certain variables, both states had relative
parity in military capabilities. In turn, as Lemke and Werner
(1996) argued in Power Parity, Commitment to Change,
and War, conflict was highly likely as both actors possessed
similar capabilities and competed for the same position in
the regional hierarchy. As such, Japan engaged in conflict
with Russia to challenge Russia’s rise to power in East Asia.
Likewise, Russia was unwilling to yield to Japan’s demands,
as doing so would hamper the ability to impose a system
favorable to its own ambitions.

This inability to compromise
on delineating spheres of
influence was largely due to the
overwhelming expansionary
ambitions of both states.
The outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War can be attributed
to the contiguity of competing expansionary ambitions. The
zero-sum game of territorial acquisition was a driving factor
in the outbreak of war. For Russia, expansion in the East,
especially in Manchuria and Korea, offered an unparalleled
economic opportunity (Katō 2007, 101). Russia had largely
been contained in the West by European interventions and
could not allow itself to be closed off in the East as well
(Geyer 1987, 192). Similarly, Japan lacked the prestige and

power of the other great powers due to its recent entrance
onto the world stage and small territorial holdings. As an
island nation, Japan needed to establish a foothold on the
Asian mainland. Yet any expansion or military buildup by
one of these powers inherently required a reciprocal response.

Incomplete information and lack
of compromise prevented the
peaceful resolution of conflict,
making war the rational choice.
The intractability of Russian and Japanese expansionary
ambitions is evidenced by their inability to negotiate.
Japanese leaders sought Russian assurances that they would
not interfere in their de facto control of Korea. Likewise,
Russian leaders wanted Japanese recognition of their
exclusive economic control of Manchuria. What doomed
negotiations was the linkage of Manchuria to Korea. Indeed,
for either state, Manchuria represented potentially massive
economic gains as a populous, resource-rich region (Katō
2007, 101). However, Russia needed to maintain a warmwater harbor at Port Arthur to effectively reap the benefits of
controlling Manchuria. For Japan, Port Arthur represented
a historical grievance against Russia and presented a direct
threat to its control of Korea. Furthermore, the potential
loss of trade with a region as large as Manchuria would be
severely detrimental to the Japanese economy that relied
heavily on trade. Bargaining over these issues was strained
by Russia’s severe underestimation of Japanese capabilities
and overestimation of its own. Indeed, Russian Viceroy of
the Far Eastern Fleet Admiral Alekseev publicly expressed
such ideas (Westwood 1986, 37). Most importantly, Tsar
Nicholas II genuinely believed that Japan would yield in the
face of Russia’s perceived superiority (Jukes 2002, 18). This
misconception regarding Japanese intentions was, in part,
the fault of the Japanese government as it failed to indicate
its resolve to go to war over the question of Korea (Katō
2007, 102). As such, incomplete information and lack of
compromise prevented the peaceful resolution of conflict,
making war the rational choice.

Conclusion

With the effective subversion of its traditional hegemony
throughout the nineteenth century, the East Asian region
quickly devolved into systemic anarchy. Hoping to fill the
void left by China’s weakness, Russia and Japan sought to
expand territorial control in the region. The Russian need for
a warm-water port in the Far East was crucial to establishing a
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strategic base in the region. Likewise, Japan lacked a foothold
on the Asian mainland and needed to secure its sphere of
influence in Korea. Thus, limited options for expansion
placed both actors in opposition to one another’s interests.
Japan’s defeat of Russian forces shocked contemporary
observers and effectively marked its ascension to regional
hegemony over East Asia. This drastic shift in the balance
of power would be a major contributing factor to Japanese
expansion into China and the South Pacific throughout the
next several decades. As a case study in competing ambitions
of great powers, the Russo-Japanese War offers an exemplary
instance of an external security dilemma and regional power
transition.

Author’s Note

Benjamin E. Mainardi (‘20)
double-majored in International Affairs and Public
Policy and Administration
and double- minored in Political Science and History.
His areas of study include
great-power
competition
and military history. Mr.
Mainardi will continue his
education with a master’s in
Security Studies starting this fall. He hopes to pursue a career
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Variation in Women’s Political
Representation Across
Countries

“women’s march Chicago 2018” by Candid Characters is licensed under CC BY-NC-ND 2.0

Julianna Heck

This cross-national study examines the ongoing gender imbalance in positions of power in local and national
governments. While some countries have gone to great lengths to combat disproportion and inequality, others have
taken steps backwards and have made it almost impossible to achieve equal opportunities for women. Despite the
fact that women make up almost half of the world’s population, men still far outnumber women in government in
the majority of countries worldwide. This quantitative study analyzes variation in women’s political representation
in four categories: domestic roles, wage parity, political systems, and gender quotas. The results suggest that
although the number of women pursuing and achieving positions of political office is increasing, challenges and
historical tendencies still persist.
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Few elements of the global body politic engage as much
consideration as women’s representation, or lack of
representation, does during elections. Women, who comprise
nearly half of the world’s population, continue to suffer
imbalance and stagnant progress. The scarcity of women in
local, state, and national government positions is a pertinent
issue for countries around the world. This enduring gender
imbalance in politics must be a concern as the world works
to address a host of old and emerging challenges.
Limited female representation continues to have effects on a
global scale, such as elevated corruption, increased cynicism
and disengagement, and curtailment of policies concentrated
on health, education, civil rights, and inclusion of minority
groups (Ashenafi, 2004; Raza, 2007). In order to more
accurately understand this breakdown, political scientists
must first grasp the mechanisms, motivations, implications,
and justifications that cause imbalance in political gender
representation. Detecting the causes of female political
underrepresentation will help actors develop effective,
enforceable policies to eliminate all forms of exclusion.
Proportionate participation and representation of women in
politics would not only contribute to justice and democracy,
but establish a necessary “pre-condition” for valuing women’s
priorities (Beauregard, 2016, p. 99; Kassa, 2015, p. 1).
A number of case studies have analyzed the scope of women’s
political underrepresentation and its causes in individual
countries, but few have investigated inclusive measures that
apply to a cross-national study (Rule, 1994). Literature has
also “draw[n] a distinction between quantitative statistical
analyses and qualitative case studies,” but few researchers have
utilized a combination of both measurement tactics (Krook,
2010, p. 233). Many sources have examined strategies to
deliver parity in the aftermath of decades of monopolized
male elections, but “limits to prediction and prescription
when it comes to implementation” have made it difficult to
calculate causal variables across distinct countries (Crocker,
2010, p. 686).

Literature Review

Beyond individual country studies, non-governmental
organizations such as the United Nations Commission on
the Status of Women (CSW), Emily’s List, the National
Women’s Political Caucus, the Sisters of Purity, and She
Should Run have allowed research on women’s political
representation on a cross-national level using data from
sources like the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development, the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU),
scholarly journals, and historical events. The data on women’s
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political representation have been evaluated on multiple
scales using various measures of analysis such as the “Women
in Politics: 2017” infographic presented at the IPU-UN Press
Conference for the CSW. The map and its accompanying
tables critically examine all causes and effects of incongruity
and reiterate the fact that, in UN Women Executive Director
Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka’s words, “persistent missing
voices of women” and an “overall stagnation and specific
reversals are warning bells of erosion of equality that we must
heed and act on rapidly” (IPU, 2017a).

Domestic Roles
During the Rosie the Riveter era of World War II, a Stokely’s
tomato advertisement urged women to “perform a service
without which this war cannot be won,” while a Chef
Boy-ar-dee commercial emphasized “not just in overalls
or a uniform—but even more in an apron—the American
woman is serving her country today as never before” (Inness,
2001, p. 124). Although the early 20th-century marketing
technique placed the value of working women on a similar
pedestal to those serving in war, they still played to the
concept of a “good-looking ... good-cooking girl” (Inness,
2001, p. 37). Suzanne O’Malley reiterated a similar theme
in a 1992 Cosmopolitan article: “as far as I’m concerned, Men
and Cooking is an oxymoron. Lots of guys cook something.
But if your life depended on someone to cook for you, who
you gonna call? A man? I doubt it” (as cited in Inness, 2001,
p. 17). While domestic tasks such as cooking and caring for
children are associated with being feminine, they do not
reflect the individuality and image of real women, but only
affirm norms fabricated by society. Even in more modern
days when a woman is allowed to replace her sewing kit or
saucepan with a stethoscope, gavel, or briefcase, some still
find the idea of a man cooking anything besides burgers and
steaks incredible.
In British Social Attitudes 30, Park et al. (2013) concluded
that “in the mid-1980s close to half of the public agreed that
‘a man’s job is to earn money; a woman’s job is to look after
the home and family’” (p. 115). The same statement was
only applicable to thirteen percent of the population in 2012
(Park et al., 2013, p. 115). The decline of the generational
“male breadwinner” family system has not only altered the
traditional patriarchal views that the woman’s place is strictly
in the household, but has allowed more women to join the
conventional workforce.
Vigil (2019) noted that “Many of the contemporary
difficulties women face as political actors are grounded in
deeply entrenched perspectives that interpret women in

2019-2020 / Volume 7
exceptionally narrow terms” (p. 189). The macho culture
of politics classifies women as unequipped to play on a
level playing field with men. Carlin and Winfrey (2009)
explained that “In general, describing women in sexist terms
reduces their credibility or may cause them to be seen as less
human” (p. 328). The media’s portrayal of the appearance
of female candidates using metaphors that illustrate women
with animal characteristics, children’s vocabulary, and food
terminology such as “foxy,” “saucy,” “old bat,” or “shrew”
minimizes their status and hinders their political success
(Carlin & Winfrey, 2009, p. 328).
Similarly, being depicted as more caring, compassionate,
understandable, and likely to be honest can bolster female
candidates, but can also minimize their ability to perform
in leadership roles, as women are “identified with emotional
matters” and questioned because of “maternal responsibilities”
(Carlin & Winfrey, 2009, p. 328). Bohn (2017) noted that
the concept of motherhood also works in two dimensions, as
it hinders their option of running for elected positions due
to perceived responsibilities to their children, but also allows
them to “[hone] their expertise regarding particular political
domains” such as reproductive rights, child care services, and
human trafficking (p. 14). The modern atmosphere of later
marriages, delayed childbearing, and declining fertility rates
has shifted the former label of motherhood and femininity as
a weakness, positing “that motherhood imbues women with
values that voters deem highly desirable in current politics”
(Bohn, 2017, p. 14).
In other countries, progress has remained less evident. The
election of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations Commission
on the Status of Women, which is dedicated to the promotion
of gender equality and empowerment of women, was highly
criticized due to the existence of a “male guardianship
system” which enables men to “remain in control over female
relatives’ lives” (Coogle, 2017). This patriarchal system
has been at the heart of unequal treatment of women in a
country which “forbids women from obtaining a passport,
marrying, or travelling abroad without the approval of a
male guardian” (Coogle, 2017). Victims of the hegemonic
system have been arrested or detained for questioning the
one-sided government regime or challenging statutes on the
claims of abuse by male counterparts (Coogle, 2017).
H1: Countries that are more accepting of traditional gender
and domestic roles as norms are less likely to have women’s
political representation.

Wage Parity

Variation in wage parity can aid in predicting the distribution
of women’s representation in government. Countries such
as Spain, Austria, and Denmark require that companies
evaluate the effectiveness of their gender equality programs
and Australian law mandates equal pay for comparable work.
Despite this progress, the World Economic Forum (2018)
projected that it will take 202 years to close the “economic
opportunity gender gap” (p. 15).
Despite the conclusive research surrounding women’s lack of
participation in politics, there is little research on the role
that money plays in keeping women from entering into
the arena of politics. Burns et al. (2001) demonstrated that
women are less disposed to run for political office if it means
that they have to go through added expenses. These costs
may include primary elections or challenging an incumbent.
This correlates with the perception that men are more riskseeking in the realm of politics, whereas women are seen
as more risk-averse. The source also takes into account
the contrasting views of feasibility and the lower levels of
encouragement that women receive from political actors.
Scholarly consensus suggests that limited access to campaign
financing and a perceived lack of ambition are viewed as lack
of qualifications for positions ranging from local governments
to high levels of parliament (Bangs, 2017).
A study conducted by the Pew Research Center noted that
“seven-in-ten women—vs. about half of men—say a major
reason why women are underrepresented in top positions
in politics and business is that they have to do more to
prove themselves” (Horowitz et al., 2018). The study also
emphasized that women are more likely than men to see
structural barriers and uneven expectations holding them
back from earning positions of high leadership. As U.S.
Bureau of the Budget official Rufus Miles observed in the
late 1940s, “Where you stand depends on where you sit”:
women typically begin their careers at lower entry positions
and earn less than men with comparable qualifications
(Wolford, 2005, p. 85).
The issue is not exclusive to North America and Europe.
Women in South Korea earn one third less than their male
counterparts, the highest gender wage gap among the
countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development. Additionally, a case study on Chile points
out that financing elections is one of the key indicators
keeping women out of political office. Chilean politician
Maria Antonieta Saa observed that “[m]en will take risks,
they will sell their family house ... but a woman is not going
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to put her family at risk” (as cited in Franceschet, 2005,
89). Similarly, China does not allow women to enter the
securities industry because it is more important for them to
marry well than find a good job. As a result of societal and
familial pressures, promotions and leadership opportunities
are extremely limited (“What Are the Obstacles,” 2017).
H2: Countries with higher levels of wage parity between
men and women will have greater political representation of
women.

Political Systems

The UN-IPU “Women in Politics: 2017” infographic
indicates there are only eleven women heads of state in 157
countries which elect their leaders. Analyses from the 1980s
and early 1990s emphasized the “importance of political
factors, such as the structure of the electoral system and the
partisan composition of parliament, as determinants of the
proportion of legislative seats held by women” (Kenworthy
& Malami, 1999, p. 236). According to USAid (2016),
“Countries with increased women’s participation and
leadership in civil society and political parties tend to be
more inclusive, responsive, egalitarian, and democratic.”
This has shown true in Bolivia with the establishment of Law
243 against harassment and political violence, which enabled
women to use their roles as legislators on an unprecedented
level (“Bolivia Approves,” 2012).
In contrast, in Saudi Arabia and other countries, there
are “legislative, social, educational, and occupational
constraints that prevent women from fully participating
in the development process of their country” (Rajkhan,
2014, pp. iv-2). Although women make up the majority of
voters in Brazil, the massive country “ranks 32nd among
the 33 Latin American and Caribbean countries according
to the proportion of women in the National Congress”
(Cristaldo, 2018). Brazilians live in a society that is “highly
oppressive towards minorities” and women, and requires a
“deconstruct[ion] of ideologies that dehumanize women”
in order to expand societal cultivation and cooperation
(Conway, 2017). Brazilian feminist scholars have concluded
that the introduction of a female approach to foreign policy
and domestic initiatives could play a considerable role in
policy decision-making impacting their country (Conway,
2017). For instance, although Australia’s first female Minister
for Foreign Affairs rejected the label of “feminist,” “she paved
the way for another woman to follow, in what has otherwise
been a male-dominated portfolio” (Conway, 2018).
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In the United States, the single member district system makes
it hard for women to break the structural and systemic barriers
that hinder their political participation. The manipulation of
the electoral system to disproportionately benefit men limits
women’s ability to discuss and restructure the systems and
barriers that block their progress. Studies have indicated
that “political scientists have known for a long time that
more women are elected in proportional representation
systems than in plurality ones,” but “have usually focused on
limitations of women themselves (their lack of aggressiveness
and interest in politics), or on prejudice by voters or party
leaders” (Welch & Studlar, 1990, pp. 391-392). Only in
recent years have investigations suggested that prejudice is
embedded in the structure of many political and electoral
systems.
Political system type is a crucial characteristic that can
determine the outcome of a country’s efforts to value women’s
representation and participation in politics. Evidence from
studies of the wealthiest democratic nations “strongly suggests
that the structure of the electoral system matters. ... [I]t is
one of the most important factors, if not the most important,
in accounting for variation in the female share of legislators”
(Kenworthy & Malami, 1999, p. 237). For example, Wilber
(2011) noted that the Rwandan government “prioritized
women, introducing structures and processes designed to
advance them at all levels of leadership.” In contrast, in
Kuwait, “women have failed in politics so far partly due to the
‘stalling’ nature of political life” (as cited in Shalaby & Obeid,
2017). The limitations to the constitution and structure of
the monarchy prevent female newcomers from mobilizing
voters, establishing electoral bases, and winning supporters.
Although no single policy will advance Kuwaiti women’s
access to political power, previous research has confirmed
that affirmative action policies are some of the most effective
mechanisms to facilitate women’s representation (“Kuwait:
Tackling Persistent Barriers,” 2016).
H3: Countries that are more democratic will have higher
levels of women’s political representation.

Gender Quotas
Crocker (2010) observes that “Research on gender quotas
has become one of the fastest growing areas of scholarship
within the subfield of women and politics,” and has
received attention and application from both developing
and developed countries (p. 686). Gender quotas have
been found to have a positive association with the number
of women holding political positions, and these structural
changes to redress the underrepresentation of women
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are easier than reconstructing political culture or shifting
economic development (Caul, 2001; Gray, 2003, p. 55).
For example, the consistent increasing rates of women
with political representation in Scandinavian countries are
congruent with findings supporting gender quota policies
(Gray, 2003, p. 54). In countries such as Rwanda, where
women outnumber men in government, “post-conflict peace
operations” in the aftermath of the genocide helped foster
gender quotas and a consolidated society (Bush, 2011, p.
103; Wilber, 2011). Paired with institutional reform, the
“institutional configurational change” that quotas offer can
promote progress (Crocker, 2010, p. 687).
Despite the increasing use of gender quotas, some scholars
argue that quotas distort the meaning of representation
and give the erroneous idea that only women can represent
women. Scholars who do not support gender quotas also
argue that reserved seats foster a competitive environment
where women compete against each other rather than work
together to collectively achieve more influence in politics
(Dhanda, 2000, p. 2969). Critics have also argued that
gender quotas “[address] only one dimension of inequality
at a time” (Hughes, 2011, p. 604). Nonetheless, gender
quotas have the potential to transform other dimensions
in the domain of politics, such as reducing voter bias and
inaugurating a norm that heterogeneous representation of
women in politics.
H4: Countries that have implemented gender quotas will
have higher levels of women’s political representation.

Methods and Data
Dependent Variable

To measure the dependent variable, I assessed women’s
political representation using the “percentage of women in
the lower or single House” of national parliaments compiled
in the IPU’s (2017b) March 2017 “Women in National
Parliaments” resource. This ratio data allowed variations
between countries to be easily calculated. Higher percentage
values corresponded with a higher number of women
holding political office, allowing me to compare female
political representation across countries using the following
independent variables: domestic roles, wage parity, political
apparatus, electoral system, and the existence of a gender
quota. These variables were tested using a linear regression
model to account for the persistent dependent variable.
The method used to calculate the proportion of seats
occupied by women in parliament does not present any
significant threats to the validity or reliability of my data.

The percentage of seats occupied by women in each single
or lower chamber of parliament was calculated by dividing
the total number of seats occupied by women by the total
number of seats in parliament. The data compiled by the
IPU (2017b) uses official statistics provided by national
parliaments and is updated on a monthly basis. The only
threat to validity is that the measure does not address the
sometimes dramatically different percentages of women in
countries’ upper houses. However, calculating the mean
percentage of women in two houses for some countries
would distort the data and lead to inaccurate comparisons.
Using only the IPU’s “%W” column in the “Lower or single
House” category guaranteed consistency since there was no
weighting or normalizing of statistics.

Independent Variables
Domestic Roles. Domestic roles is one of the most prominent
variables discussed in the literature. Similar to the culture
variable, defining acceptance of traditional gender and
domestic roles as societal norms is a troublesome task. I used
the Gender Inequality Index (GII) from the United Nations
Development Programme’s (2018) Human Development
Indices and Indicators: 2018 Statistical Update to test this
variable. The GII represents inequalities using a zero to one
scale, with higher values indicating increased inequalities.
As a whole, the GII “shows the loss in potential human
development due to disparity between female and male
achievements in three dimensions: reproductive health,
empowerment and the labour market” (United Nations
Development Programme, 2019). The GII “relies on data
from major publicly available international databases,” which
in turn draw on reputable organizations like the World
Health Organization, the World Bank, the IPU, UNESCO,
and UNICEF (United Nations Development Programme,
2019). While the index does not capture important concerns
like gender-based violence and asset ownership due to
limited data availability, it offers a clear understanding of the
achievement gaps between men and women.
Wage Parity. While wage disparity is closely related to
educational attainment and social class, this variable
provided distinctions that outside factors did not take into
consideration. Wage disparity gives insight into psychological
questions of motivation that limit women from gaining
political office. It is important to note that these factors are
often outside of their control. I used the Global Gender
Gap Index (GGGI), from the World Economic Forum’s
(2017) Global Gender Gap Report, which examines the gap
between men and women in four subindexes, but I only
applied the data from the “Economic Participation and
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Opportunity” category. This subindex reflects differences
between women and men in workforce participation, earned
income, and advancement in technical and professional
positions (p. 5). By removing the three other subindexes, I
eliminated the possibility of tautology in the areas of health
and empowerment, which are fundamental components of
the GII. Additionally, while education has helped women
to begin catching up to men in holding seats in national
parliaments, the literature indicates that advances in women’s
education pale in comparison to the existence of unequal pay
for equal work. Achieving the same advanced degrees as men
can aid in women’s political representation, but if women
cannot afford the added expenses, then it is a lost cause.
The GGGI’s zero to one scale from imparity to parity is
calculated for each country. These benchmarks—0 for
complete inequality and 1 for complete equality—are
kept fixed over time, which increases the consistency of
the measure (World Economic Forum, 2017, p. 7). This
also allows scholars to follow the progression of individual
countries in relation to a perceived standard of ideal equality
levels. There are no anticipated threats to reliability because
a “country must have data available for a minimum of 12
indicators out of the 14 that make up the index” to be
included in the report (World Economic Forum, 2017, p.
7). Additionally, 106 of the 144 countries in the 2017 GGGI
have been consistently included in the report every year since
the first edition was published in 2006, and any “missing
data is clearly marked” (World Economic Forum, 2017, p.
7).
Political Systems. To measure operationalization of political
structure and stability, I utilized the Polity IV Project,
a constantly updated dataset supported by the Political
Instability Task Force (Marshall et al., 2017; Polity Project,
2017). In order to assess democracy and autocracy, the
Polity IV Project utilizes factors such as competitiveness of
political participation, openness of executive recruitment,
and constraints on the chief executive (Marshall et al., 2017).
I focused on whether a particular structure of government
favors female prominence in its legislature in comparison to
others. The -10 to +10 scale of individual country regime
change does not limit countries by a selective number of
categories and allows for discernible differences in scores.
Some validity concerns may exist as scarce or missing data
could alter the score positively or negatively in one direction.
However, few reliability concerns threaten the measurement
techniques of the Polity IV Project since “multiple historical
sources were used for each country” and ambiguity was
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reviewed with special attention to questions of consistency
(Marshall et al., 2017, p. 5). Intercoder reliability was
maintained because the coding guidelines were applied in
an undeviating manner by four individuals, even though the
components were scored and weighed by hand. The data
series “regularly examine[s] and often challenge[s] codings”
by analysts and experts in academia, policy, and intelligence
(Polity Project, 2017). These approaches increase confidence
that the judgments do not reflect the views of one individual
and if they do, the idiosyncrasies are explicit in the coding
guidelines.
Gender Quotas. Legislated gender quotas are one of the fastest
growing subfields of political science scholarship, as they
are viewed as a solution to battling the primitive and oldest
forms of inequality. To test this variable, I utilized the Gender
Quotas Database maintained by the International Institute
for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (2019). The variable
places countries on a scale ranging from “1-No Quotas,
2-Legislated Candidate Quotas, 3-Reserved Seats, and
4-Political Party Quotas” (International, 2019). I recoded
this variable to combine the three classifications of gender
quotas. Grouping one was recoded to represent a value of
zero and groupings two, three, and four all received a score
of one. This recoding was designed to clearly distinguish the
countries with an established gender quota from those who
have an absence of quotas. I hypothesized that countries
with mandated gender quotas are likely to have more female
representation in politics, so the alteration of my independent
variable helps to make my prediction more striking.
There were no obvious threats to validity or reliability since I
eliminated the possibility of flawed or inaccurate methodology
by recoding the variable. Even though there are three distinct
types of gender quotas, they all have an identical objective
of ensuring that women hold a critical minority of 30-40%
in political representation. Grouping each classification
of gender quotas into one system eliminates any threat to
changes in the quota type from constitutional or legislative
to voluntary overtime by centralizing on the existence of a
quota in contrast to the specific nature of each quota type.
As a whole, my research study has strong external validity.
I selected data sources that have at least 120 cases out of
195 and that reflect all geographic regions, government
types, and systematic electoral decisions. I also used data
from 2014-2019, which allowed access to the most accurate
percentages, legislation, and constitutional changes. I was
not able to calculate every variable that factors into female
representation in government, but I chose the variables with
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the largest pools of literature and combined some aspects of
other variables, such as health and education, into existing
independent variables.
I believe that my study has moderately strong internal validity,
but lacks a substantial measure for wage parity and domestic
roles. It may be difficult to prove that my independent
variables came before my dependent variables, and some
relationships may prove to be spurious. For example, it may
be challenging to determine if fewer women are represented
in politics due to disparities in wages and lack of ambition,
or if wage disparities exist because there are no women in
politics to change legislation and mandate that both genders
be paid the same for equal work.

Control Variable
Due to the nature of my empirical research, a control variable
would have no major effect on the relationships between my
dependent variable and the four independent variables, and
would not be the cause of a spurious relationship. It would
also be impossible for a country to possess a value of zero
for each variable. While a country could have a value of zero
for the variable of gender quotas (signifying the absence of
a quota), no country exists that has a value of zero for the
variable of wage parity. For example, Burundi has the highest
level of parity, with a value of .911, and Syria holds the highest
level of imparity, with a value of .274 (World Economic
Forum, 2017, pp. 10-11). Palazzolo (n.d.) suggests that “if
there are fewer than 1,000 cases, it will be very difficult to
test a control variable,” and my study only has 120 cases.

Results and Discussion
Domestic Roles

My regression analysis showed that domestic roles, as defined
using the GII, have an extremely significant relationship (.000
significance level) to the percentage of occupied seats held by
women in parliaments (see Table 1). Due to the extensive
literature on domestic roles in relation to gender stereotypes,
sexism, and relation of emotion to lack of ability, it makes
sense that this relationship proved significant, although I
did not predict that it would be as significant as it was. The
unstandardized regression coefficient for the GII (-20.522)
supports my hypothesis that there is a negative relationship
between the variables. In a general sense, unstandardized B is
used to determine the direction of the relationship between
the independent and dependent variables. As the value of the
independent variable increases, the dependent variable either
increases or decreases. In my analysis, as the numerical value
of the GII increases, the percentage of women represented in
national Parliaments decreases.

Standardized B helps determine the strength of the
relationship. Higher values indicate a stronger relationship
and lower values indicate a weaker relationship. The
standardized regression coefficient for Domestic Roles (-.337)
is the largest coefficient in my analysis, which validates that
Domestic Roles has the strongest influence on the amount
of women gaining access to seats in parliaments in relation
to my other independent variables. Despite having the most
prominence on my dependent variable, the standardized
coefficient value of -.337 establishes that the strength of
the relationship is moderately strong and may not have as
great of an influence in determining prediction of women’s
representation in politics as I predicted.
Table 1: Regression Analysis of Relationships Between
Independent Variables and the Percentage of Seats Held by
Women in Single or Lower House Parliments.

Note. Dependent variable: percentage of occupied seats held
by women in parliaments. N=120; 120 of 195 possible
counties were utilized in this study. R2=.267
*Significant at .05

Wage Parity
My regression analysis also showed that Wage Parity was
very significant (.005 significance level). Additionally, the
unstandardized regression coefficient of 23.446 supports my
hypothesis that countries with higher levels of wage parity
will have a greater representation of women in the legislature. However, the standardized regression coefficient of .259
highlights that the relationship between wage parity and
women’s political representation is weak, which could be a
result of a poor measurement. Although the GGGI captures
the idea of wage equality for similar work, it also emphasizes
the value of work, which could distort statistical analyses of
wage inequality. The weak standardized regression coefficient
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could also be the result of a non-causal relationship where
fewer women are represented in parliaments not because of
wage disparities and indifference, but because of the lack of
a female presence in policy-making mandating higher wage
parity. Moreover, the Pearson correlation value of -.375 suggests that, despite uncertainty in the literature, the methods
used for Domestic Roles and Wage Parity do not result in
multicollinearity. In other words, the low strength of the association for Domestic Roles and Wage Parity suggests that
there are few intercorrelations or inter-associations between
the two variables.

Political Systems
My results revealed that the relationship between women’s
political representation and political systems was extremely
insignificant (.969 significance level), which does not support
my hypothesis. The unstandardized coefficient of .007 shows
that when there is a 20 unit increase in the polity scale
(difference between -10 and +10), the percent of women
occupying seats in Parliament only increases by .14%. This
mathematical computation explains that a one unit increase
in polity (going from the most autocratic regime to the most
democratic regime) improves the percentage of women
in politics, but by an extremely small and unimpactful
amount. This idea correlates with the standardized regression
coefficient of .004, which is exceedingly weak.
Since my literature review did not reveal a consensus that
political systems that are more democratic will have a
higher percentage of women represented in politics, it is not
surprising that the independent variable is very weak and not
significant. Reynolds (1999) highlighted that “democracy
in itself is not necessarily a precursor to the presence of
substantial numbers of women in political life,” but is
instead a familiarity with more women in positions of power
and acceptance of women as leaders (p. 572). Similarly, Rule
(1994) drew upon the work of Haavio-Mannila, articulating
that variation in “women’s parliamentary representation
in long-established but ‘unfinished democracies’” are
caused “primarily [by] the electoral arrangements by which
legislators are chosen” (p. 689). Rule explained that these
electoral “arrangements are amenable to change faster
than social biases and other barriers to women’s election
opportunity and fair representation” (p. 689). On the other
hand, case studies and qualitative evidence support the idea
that the “effect of ideology is substantially stronger than the
effects of political variables” (Paxton, 2003, p. 88).
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Gender Quotas

The regression analysis showed that the relationship between
gender quotas and women’s representation in politics is
extremely significant (.001 significance level). These findings
support my hypothesis that countries with implemented
gender quotas have a higher percentage of women in politics,
which implies a growth in support and opportunities for
female candidates and a decline in political institutions with
high levels of male dominance and power.
Although my standardized regression coefficient of .273
for Gender Quotas is not very strong, some scholars have
highlighted that of the top 20 countries in terms of female
representation in government, 17 of them utilize some sort
of a gender quota (International, 2019; IPU, 2017a). These
findings suggest that the results of implemented gender
quotas go far beyond statistical analysis. Comparatively,
the implementation of gender quotas increases women’s
representation in politics by 6.124% on a zero to one scale,
where a value of zero is representative of the absence of a
quota and a value of one is representative of the existence of
a gender quota.

Conclusion

The greatest obstacle when trying to accurately determine
the causes of the current state of women’s political (under)
representation was the time restriction and limited availability
of resources. Increased time and resources would allow me
to find better measures for variables, particularly domestic
roles and wage parity, which could in turn produce more
accurate and significant results. More specifically, a more
valid measurement for distinguishing economic participation
and opportunity and whether a country has mandated wage
parity legislation could be created. Additional research would
allow me to include additional variables or gather my own
data. This could possibly produce more substantial results
that would assist future researchers and scholars looking to
solve the causes of this socio-structural and cultural issue.
My main empirical findings were the significant correlations
between three of my independent variables and the
percentage of single or lower chamber parliamentary seats
occupied by women. More explicitly, I found that Domestic
Roles—which measures the dimensions of reproductive
health, empowerment, and economic status—had the
greatest impact on a country’s number of women represented
in the national parliament. Gender inequality was also the
most significant variable as a determinant of the prevalence
of traditionalistic attitudes and domestic roles. An additional
finding was the R-squared value of .267. R-squared—
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the coefficient of determination—is the proportion of
variance in the dependent variable that is predicted from
the independent variable. In my study, the R-squared
value of .267 signifies that 26.7% of the causes of female
representation in politics were explained by the four variables
in my regression. Although this number only explains
roughly a quarter of the research question I am trying to
solve, it shows that the carefully selected variables and forms
of measurement do in fact help explain variation in women’s
political representation.
My careful selection of variables allowed 120 cases using
countries as the unit of analysis to truly encompass the
diversity and complexity of the global spectrum. It is
important to acknowledge that the Political Systems
variable did not prove to be significant and that I omitted
variables such as educational attainment, media influence,
and militarism due to a “lack of data” and consensus in the
literature on a cross-national scale (Matland, 1998, p. 110).
Matland (1998) in “Women’s Representation in National
Legislatures: Developed and Developing Countries” suggested
that “considerable work remains to be done” across nations.
While “evidence of systems for women’s electoral success [are]
consistent and striking,” a “minimum development level is
needed to create a foundation for other variables to have an
effect” (Kenworthy & Malami, 1999, pp. 261-262; Matland,
1998, p. 120). As the level of development increases, “more
women start to acquire the resources needed to become
politically relevant, resources such as education, salaried
labor force experience, and training in the professions that
dominate politics (such as law)” (Matland, 1998, p. 120).

With more time and resources, I would calculate which
countries mandate equal pay and which countries do not in
order to create a binary response with no flexibility. I would
also study the characteristics of country leaders to determine
whether there is diversity in the women represented or if they
all advocate for the same issues, members of similar parties,
from similar backgrounds, etc. It would be interesting to
see how the portrayal of women in the media influences
willingness to select female candidates, especially with
respect to recent literature about female politicians regarding
their appearance and other physical characteristics.
This research paper could foreshadow case study analysis
of countries with implemented gender quotas compared to
those with an absence of quotas or could facilitate discussion
on the effectiveness of a quota within a single country. Some
of these debates could examine whether quotas generate
cultural, attitudinal, or behavioral shifts among citizens.
In The Impact of Gender Quotas, Franceschet et al. (2012)
reflected on the idea that quotas may “reinforce a gendered
division of labor in parliament whereby women work on
less prestigious social issues, while men focus on policy areas
traditionally deemed more important” (p. 230). My findings
can illuminate the complexity of the quota question and can
contribute to a second generation of quota research.

While the regression analysis revealed significant relationships
between certain independent variables and women’s
representation in politics, the results are in no way absolute.
The addition of new independent variables may cause a
variable that was once significant to become unsubstantial
and vice versa. Measurements used for Domestic Roles and
Wage Parity were not ideal, and the moderately strong and
weak relationships were established by the lack of validity
in the measures. Moreover, the results for Political Systems
using the Polity IV Project demonstrate that while the
measure may not have lacked reliability or validity, perhaps
there really is no relationship between political systems and
the amount of women represented in respective parliaments.
My R-squared value of .267 emphasizes that there is still
much to learn and discover about this subject matter and
that more in-depth research and analysis is necessary.
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MOVE:
Philadelphia’s Forgotten Bombing

Charles Abraham
“Philadelphia Free the MOVE 9 Forum” by Joe Piette is licensed under CC BY-NC-SA 2.0

On May 13, 1985, the city of Philadelphia erupted into flames. Under the orders of Mayor Wilson Goode, the
Philadelphia Police Department dropped a bomb onto the row house containing MOVE, a cult-like organization,
on Osage Avenue in West Philadelphia. The resulting fire killed eleven people, including five children, and burned
down sixty-one houses. By examining newspaper articles on MOVE, the bombing by the Philadelphia Police, and
the public’s response, this paper investigates how Mayor Goode was able to continue his political career and how
this bombing has faded into obscurity outside of the city. The media’s attitude and reporting on MOVE, the city’s
lack of connection with MOVE’s beliefs, and the efforts of the city government to move on from the bombing
have caused this tragedy to become largely forgotten.
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In a fortified row house in West Philadelphia, a bomb
dropped by Philadelphia Police killed eleven MOVE
members, including five children, and burned down sixtyone her houses after a lengthy standoff between the two
groups. MOVE is a cult-like organization which eschewed
technology, medicine and western clothing, where members
lived communally, ate raw food, left garbage on their yards,
and proselytized with a loudspeaker, frustrating the residents
of Osage Avenue. The MOVE bombing, remembered as
“May 13, 1985” in West Philadelphia, was the first time a
U.S. city bombed itself, and it could have been a pivotal
moment in the mayoral reign of Wilson Goode and for
the city of brotherly love. Instead, the bombing has faded
into obscurity, with only minimal consequences for the
city government and for the city. Public antipathy and the
efforts of the city government to move on from the bombing,
revealed and even enabled by media reporting, have caused
this tragedy to become largely forgotten.1

tables, nuts, and eggs; used no medicine or western clothing;
disposed of their garbage in the yard; and used outhouses
instead of conventional toilets. The children of MOVE were
not allowed to attend school and had never eaten cooked
food or watched television. These were the first “pure”
members of MOVE: they were raised to never be exposed
to the corrupting influences of social and political institutions. Members protested outside of zoos and pet stores,
which often led to arrests though the police did not believe
MOVE was even potentially violent during the early 1970s.2

MOVE: The Organization

The other residents of Powelton Village did not hold a
great opinion of MOVE, which lived communally in three
townhouses in the neighborhood. Powelton Village, located
near Drexel University and the University of Pennsylvania,
was a diverse and tolerant community and a haven for
political activists. In 1976, neighbors began complaining
about children playing in the yard without diapers and
in unsanitary conditions. The complaints of Powelton
residents’ and MOVE’s campaign against police brutality
caused the Philadelphia Police Department to set up 24hour surveillance on the MOVE townhouses, fueling their
belief that they were being targeted by the police. The next
year, MOVE members began to sit out on the porch holding
rifles, wearing berets, and using loudspeakers to lecture their
neighbors. MOVE already held a reputation as a radical
black organization, much like the Black Panthers, because
of MOVE’s emergence during the “Black Power” era. Many
people in Philadelphia believed the public display of weapons
to be the start of the organization becoming more militant.3

Vincent Leaphart founded the American Christian Movement for Life, later shortened to MOVE, in 1972 in West
Philadelphia and changed his name to John Africa. MOVE
was primarily a black organization, although white people
could join as well. As an anti-establishment and anti-technology group, its members ate a diet of only raw fruits, vege1 For further reading on cults in America, see Willa Appel, Cults in America:
Programmed for Paradise (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1983), which
discusses the phenomenon of cults and how one is indoctrinated or breaks out of
a cult. For further reading on African Americans in mid-20th century America see
Dorothy K. Newman et al., Protest, Politics and Prosperity: Black Americans and White
Institutions, 1940-1975 (New York: Pantheon, 1978) or Annette Gordon-Reed, ed.,
Race on Trial: Law and Justice in American History (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2002), which discuss how African Americans were treated by the police and
in the court as well as other white-dominated institutions during this period. For
more on MOVE, see J.M. Floyd-Thomas, “The Burning of Rebellious Thoughts:
MOVE as Revolutionary Black Humanism,” The Black Scholar 32, no.1 (Spring
2002): 11-21, https://www.jstor.org/stable/41068961, which argues MOVE was a
radical and religious group that exemplified revolutionary black humanist thinking.
For more on the effect of the media on the perception of MOVE, see Kimberly
Sanders and Judson Jeffries, “Framing MOVE: A Press’ Complicity in the Murder
of Women and Children in the City of (Un) Brotherly Love,” Journal of African
American Studies 17, no. 4 (December 2013): 566-586, https://doi.org/10.1007/
s12111-013-9252-7, which discusses how press coverage led to antipathy towards
the MOVE organization. For more on the MOVE bombing and its aftermath, see
Robin Wagner-Pacifici, Discourse and Destruction: The City of Philadelphia versus
MOVE (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); Hizkias Assefa, Extremist
Groups and Conflict Resolution: The MOVE Crisis in Philadelphia (New York:
Praeger, 1988); Margot Harry, “Attention MOVE—This is America!” Sage Journals
28, no. 4 (April 1987): 5-28, https://doi.org/10.1177/030639688702800402;
Georgia A. Persons, “The Philadelphia MOVE Incident as an Anomaly in Models
of Mayoral Leadership,” Phylon 48, no. 4 (December 1987): 249-260, https://doi.
org/10.2307/274482; or John Anderson and Hilary Hevenor, Burning Down the
House: MOVE and the Tragedy of Philadelphia (New York: Norton, 1987), which
all discuss the bombing and how it affected Philadelphia and the city government.
The Philadelphia Inquirer reported on MOVE and the bombing from 19851987. Temple University Library Special Collections houses the records of the
Philadelphia Special Investigation Commission regarding the MOVE bombing and
its antecedents.
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The MOVE bombing,
remembered as “May 13, 1985“
in West Philadelphia,
was the first time a U.S. city
bombed itself.

Tensions between the city and MOVE began to rise as
neighbors in Powelton continued complaining about
MOVE’s actions and as the police department’s surveillance
began to infuriate the organization. Between 1977 and
1978, MOVE placed bomb-timing devices, though no
explosives, in several hotels across the nation as well as in
2 Wagner-Pacifici, Discourse and Destruction, 27-29; Sanders and Jeffries,
“Framing MOVE,” 568; Floyd-Thomas, “The Burning of Rebellious Thoughts,”
13; Jack N. Nagel, “Psychological Obstacles to Administrative Responsibility:
Lessons of the MOVE Disaster,” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 10, no.
1 (Winter 1991): 2-3, https://doi.org/10.2307/3325510; Assefa, Extremist Groups,
14-15.
3 Wagner-Pacifici, Discourse and Destruction, 29-31; Nagel, “Psychological
Obstacles,” 3-4; Floyd-Thomas, “The Burning of Rebellious Thoughts,” 11-21.
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London.4 These devices were left with threatening letters
stating that MOVE would strike for real unless Philadelphia
stopped its harassment. The organization had begun a feud
with then-Mayor Frank Rizzo, who had previously served as
Philadelphia’s Police Commissioner and run for mayor on
a law-and-order campaign. MOVE’s residency in Powelton
Village came to a head in 1978 after an agreement between
the organization and the city made on May 5 disintegrated.
The city and MOVE had agreed that the city would end
the blockade and within 90 days MOVE members would
relocate to a residence outside the city. MOVE saw the city
as the center of the societal corruption they sought to end
and stayed past the 90-day limit. While several organizations
active in Powelton Village at the time were either pro-MOVE
or supported negotiation with MOVE to allow them to stay
in the neighborhood, MOVE and the police engaged in a
protracted firefight resulting in the death of one policeman,
Officer James Ramp, and the sentencing of nine MOVE
members to jail for the officer’s death.5

The policy of non-confrontation
and avoidance proved
ineffective, and in 1984 the
Philadelphia Police began to
plan a course of action against
MOVE.
After being forced out of Powelton Village, MOVE took
up residence in a row house on Osage Avenue in Cobbs
Creek, West Philadelphia. At first, the organization and the
residents of Osage Avenue coexisted peacefully. In time,
however, tensions began to as lifestyle differences emerged
and the neighbors began complaining. MOVE removed the
flea collars off of their neighbors’ pets, collected and fed wild
animals, built pigeon coops, and left their refuse outside
in their yard. Most distressing to Osage Avenue residents
was that the MOVE children appeared to be malnourished
and rummaged through their trash looking for food. The
neighbors were told Wilson Goode would help them after
he had become mayor, but in late 1983 after the mayoral
election, MOVE began to use bullhorns and loudspeakers to
harass their neighbors.6
4 While MOVE left these letters and devices across the nation and internationally, they were still only an organization local to Philadelphia and were not
expanding nationally.
5 Wagner-Pacifici, Discourse and Destruction, 30-32; Nagel, “Psychological
Obstacles,” 16; Assefa, Extremist Groups, 20-37. Nine members of MOVE were
convicted in the shooting of Officer James Ramp during the 1978 shootout
with the police and were sentenced with thirty to one hundred years in prison.
Thesemembers are known collectively as “The MOVE 9.”
6 Assefa, Extremist Groups, 102-108; Nagel, “Psychological Obstacles” 5.

MOVE believed Mayor Goode had the ability to release
the jailed MOVE 9 members, and they knew if they
began to harass residents of Osage Avenue—a middleclass neighborhood and the bedrock of Goode’s political
support—the city would have to pay attention to them.
Despite MOVE holding the block hostage, Goode used
apolicy of “appeasement, non-confrontation and avoidance,”
attempting to avoid conflict in any way possible.7 City
Operating Departments—Health, Water, Human Services,
Streets, and Licences and Inspections—were barred by city
policy from carrying out their responsibilities at the MOVE
row house. City officials believed that once MOVE members
realized the city was ignoring them, they would either change
their belligerent behavior or leave the city. The policy of
non-confrontation and avoidance proved ineffective, and in
1984 the Philadelphia Police began to plan a course of action
against MOVE, one of the first signs of what was to come.8

May 13, 1985
Mayor Goode told the police he needed a plan of action
against MOVE in the spring of 1985. He wanted to explore
the possibilities of arresting some MOVE members and
obtaining a court order to hold the children. MOVE began
fortifying their row house in earnest in the fall of 1984 and
the winter of 1985, building a bunker made of railroad
ties, logs, and steel plates on the top of their house; they
used similar material to fortify the walls. In April 1985,
they announced with bullhorns their intentions to kill the
mayor or any police officer who approached the fortified
house. Neighbors threatened to take matters into their own
hands after claiming to have seen men with rifles on the
roof and in the bunker of the house. On the morning of
May 13, 1985, the police attempted to serve warrants for
the arrests of four MOVE members. These warrants were for
misdemeanor charges and primarily intended to get them
out of the neighborhood. Mayor Goode required that any
officers involved in the 1978 shooting not be involved in
the operation on Osage Avenue, but several of those officers
were present in the assault force. At 5:30 a.m. outside the
MOVE row house, police used a bullhorn to announce the
names of the members to be arrested for illegal possession
of explosives and terroristic threats and gave the members
fifteen minutes to surrender. MOVE refused. Police insertion
teams then entered the houses on either side. In response,
MOVE shot at the police force from inside. Over the next
hour and a half, the Philadelphia police fired over 10,000
7 “Excerpts from Commission’s Report on Bombing,” New York Times, March
7, 1986.
8 Wagner-Pacifici, Discourse and Destruction, 32, 82-85; Nagel, “Psychological
Obstacles,” 7; Assefa, Extremist Groups, 110-111; Persons, “The Philadelphia
MOVE Incident,” 255.
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rounds of ammunition on the row house and used explosives
to blow holes in the walls. By 10:40 a.m., the front of the
house was destroyed, but the fortifications MOVE installed
in the winter had held, preventing the police from seizing the
house. When it became clear their tactics had failed, Mayor
Goode announced during a televised press conference he
would take the house by any means necessary.9
After the press conference, the police sought another way
to force the eleven people out of the house that included
the use of explosives. They began assembling an explosive
entry device around 4:30 p.m., and around thirty minutes
later, Mayor Goode approved the use of the entry device. At
5:27 p.m., the police dropped an explosive package from a
helicopter onto the bunker of the house. When the bomb
exploded, it did not remove the bunker; rather, it ignited
a gasoline tank. Instead of trying to contain the resulting
blaze, the police and fire commissioners let the bunker burn.
It was not until 6:32 p.m. that the fire department turned
on its hoses, and it was not until 9:30 p.m. that they took
more active steps to contain the fire. The fire raged on until
11:41 p.m., engulfing 61 homes, damaging 110 additional
houses, killing John Africa and the ten other occupants of
the MOVE house, five of them children, and leaving 250
men, women, and children homeless.10

Response to the MOVE Bombing
The bombing of the MOVE row house should have been
a pivotal event in the history of Philadelphia, showing the
incompetence of city officials in an explosive finale. Yet, after
the bombing, Mayor Goode and the Philadelphia Police
Department received support from around the country. The
Los Angeles Police Chief at the time, Daryl Gates, defended
the use of an explosive device, declaring it “a sound tactic.”
Gates also stated that Mayor Goode had “provided some of
the finest leadership [he had] ever seen from any politician”
and that he hoped Mayor Goode “ran for national office.”
Michael Nutter, then an assistant to a city councilman,
said “[MOVE] is a group of people whose philosophy is
based on conflict and confrontation.” Roy Innis, who was
the chairman of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE),
called Mayor Goode’s handling of the crisis “heroic.” Tom
Cremans, the former director of Accuracy Systems Inc.,
which sells munitions to police departments, said “the police
exercised remarkable restraint in not using the device earlier.”
However, the bomb squads of many cities were reluctant to
9 Wagner-Pacifici, Discourse and Destruction, 87-94; Assefa, Extremist Groups, 111-113;
Nagel, “Psychological Obstacles,” 6-8.
10 Wagner-Pacifici, Discourse and Destruction, 95-96; Assefa, Extremist Groups,
113; Nagel, “Psychological Obstacles,” 9.
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comment on the incident, not wishing to criticize their
fellow officers.11
Despite those speaking in favor of the mayor and the
Philadelphia Police Department, not all law enforcement
officers were complimentary of Philadelphia’s handling of
the MOVE crisis. The director of the American Federation
of Police, Gerald Arenberg, believed “They broke every rule
in the book” when it came to their handling of the incident.
James Fife, a police lieutenant in New York City, described it
by saying, “They burned down the village to save the village”
before adding that the actions taken by the Philadelphia
Police Department were “really unheard of.” Arenberg stated
the Philadelphia police “just weren’t using all the equipment
available to any modern police department.” The MOVE
bombing captured the attention of the world, and as many
law enforcement agencies weighed in on the actions of the
Philadelphia police, so too did the media, both national and
international.12

Front pages of many
newspapers showed pictures of
smoldering row houses in West
Philadelphia.
The media took a largely critical view of the incident and
Mayor Goode. Many newspapers around the world were
unsympathetic to the siege of the MOVE house and called
Philadelphia a “war zone.” Front pages of many newspapers
showed pictures of smoldering row houses in West
Philadelphia. The Washington Post referred to the pictures
as resembling “war-torn Beirut” and the New York Daily
News called the bombing “a terrible, unnecessary, and costly
blunder.” The bombing attracted international attention
with newspapers in France paying considerable attention
to the incident. The France-Soir had an aerial photo of the
devastation, and Liberation, a French tabloid, called it “one
of the most unbelievable urban guerrilla operations that
America has ever known.” In Moscow, a newscaster reported
“six dead, 60 houses destroyed, hundreds homeless—such is
the sinister result of a bloody slaughter which was launched
by police.” The San Francisco Chronicle was extremely
11 Ron Wolf, William K. Marimow, Steve Lopez, and John Woestendiek, “How
the Bomb Decision Was Made,” Philadelphia Inquirer, May 17, 1985; Tom Infield,
Doreen Carvajal, and Robert J. Terry, “MOVE Letter Threatened Fire: Sent Two
Days Prior to Assault,” Philadelphia Inquirer, May 20, 1985; William K. Stevens,
“Police Drop Bomb on Radicals’ Home in Philadelphia,” New York Times, May 14,
1985.
12 Tim Weiner, “Experts on Police Procedure Criticize Bombing of House,”
Philadelphia Inquirer, May 15, 1985.
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harsh in its criticism, writing there was “no excuse” for the
bombing and it was “an astonishing example of overkill.”
The Atlanta Journal-Constitution was also critical, calling the
bombing reckless and including comments from people such
as Burton Caine, the president of the Philadelphia chapter of
the American Civil Liberties Union, who called the bombing
“totally unjustified,” and New York City mayor Edward
Koch, who stated that “if [he] had a police commissioner
so stupid to allow a bomb to be thrown into a house, [he]
would remove him.” The Dallas Morning News focused on
the residents of the 6200 block of Osage Avenue. Kevin
Young called the bombing “unjustifiable” and said Osage
Avenue “is not a battle zone.” Another resident said that he
was “totally disgusted” with the city and how it had handled
the crisis. These harsh comments about the administration
and its actions were widespread after May 13, 1985 but only
for a short period of time. The national news moved on after
a few weeks of reporting on MOVE, and eventually only the
Philadelphia Inquirer was doing any meaningful reporting on
the aftermath of the bombing.13
Despite all these critical reports, some newspapers were more
supportive of Philadelphia and the mayor. The New York
Times referred to MOVE as a radical group, focused more
on the complaints from the neighbors against MOVE, and
framed the incident as a city reacting against behavior that was
well out of the norm for a working-class African American
neighborhood. In the Times article, Dee Peoples, the owner of
a store two blocks away from the MOVE house, said that “all
you hear is aggression. You sleep with it, you wake up with it,
you live with it.” The San Francisco Chronicle wrote about the
group’s strange philosophy and how while it was, in theory,
a “philosophy of anti-materialism, pacifism and concern for
the environment,” in practice “its history was replete with
violence, obscenity and filth.” The Chronicle article stated that
former MOVE member Donald Glassey had testified John
Africa “had planned an armed confrontation with police and
had MOVE members make bombs and buy firearms.” The
Lexington Herald-Leader, like the Times, described MOVE as
a radical organization and defined the cause of the siege as
MOVE refusing “to leave the house under an eviction order
from police.” The Herald article also discussed neighbors’
complaints of “assaults, robberies, and a stench at the house.”
The positive media surrounding the administration shielded
it from dealing with the harsh realities of their actions and
13 Jane Eisner, “Media Blitz: West Philadelphia Disaster Makes Front-Page
Headlines Around the World,” Philadelphia Inquirer, May 16, 1985; “Police
Overkill,” San Francisco Chronicle, May 15, 1985; “Police Tactics Questioned
– Experts Call Use of Explosives in Siege Situations ‘Reckless,’” Atlanta JournalConstitution, May 15, 1985; “225 Left Homeless by Philadelphia Fire – Uprooted
Residents Sorrowful, Angry; Mayor Defends MOVE Incident,” Dallas Morning
News, May 15, 1985.

allowed it a reprieve from the negative media of the bombing.
The Philadelphia administration’s actions during this crisis
were highly criticized and opinion was divided among news
sources in the city and around the globe, but it was a much
different story among the Philadelphia public.14

The national news moved on
after a few weeks of reporting
on MOVE.
Many believed they were receiving biased news reports. One
woman from Valley Forge stated she “believed the mayor
did a commendable job,” and “[the press was] questioning
the mayor too much.” Tourists visiting Philadelphia in the
aftermath of the bombing had a similar reaction: “MOVE? It
could have happened anywhere.” One resident of Northeast
Philadelphia, Eli Teper, complained the police “used too
little force” and “criminals should be treated as such.”
Steward Beatty, also of Northeast Philadelphia, thought the
bombing was justified and it was “nice to see that somebody
can still make decisions instead of doing nothing.” Steve
Harmon, a resident of West Philadelphia, said the bombing
was “like Vietnam.” While the media and the police around
the country were divided on the incident, most people in
Philadelphia appeared to see it as a tragedy but remained
supportive of the mayor and the city overall.15
The media’s discussion about the incident shifted closer to
the view of the public. While it was a tragedy, most blame
rested on the shoulders of MOVE. Two days before the
bombing, MOVE sent a letter threatening to set fire to their
row house and the neighboring house should the police
attack. This letter began, “If MOVE go down, not only will
everyone in this block go down, the knee joints of America
will break and the body of America will soon fall.” Then the
letter threatened, “Before we let you mutha f-s [sic] make
an example of us we will burn this mutha f-in [sic] house
down and burn you all up with us.” The city administration
began using the letter to blame MOVE for setting the fire
that burned down sixty-one houses and killed eleven people.
Police Commissioner Gregore Sambor stated it was his
“personal opinion” that MOVE “started or assisted” the fire,
and was “convinced that MOVE people saturated those roofs
with gasoline.” Mayor Goode said the letter showed MOVE
was “a group that was bent on absolute destruction, a group
14 Eisner, “Media Blitz”; Stevens, “Police Drop Bomb”; “MOVE’s Strange
Philosophy of Militancy and Escapism,” San Francisco Chronicle, May 15, 1985;
“Radical Group Holds Police at Bay,” Lexington Herald-Leader, May 14, 1985.
15 Joyce Gemperlein, “Visitors Say the City’s Image Will Survive,” Philadelphia
Inquirer, May 19, 1985; Stevens, “Police Drop Bomb.”
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that was, in fact, a guerilla group inside an urban area.” The
mayor also stated that the release of the letter was not meant
as evidence that MOVE started the fire but that the letter
“says what it says, in [his] opinion.”16

The city attempted to paint MOVE
as the agressor, framing the
actions they had undertaken as
merely providing law and order.
In lockstep with the theory of MOVE burning down the
street, the city began to discuss how the entry device used
was extremely safe and could not have caused the fire.
The explosive used in the bombing was known as Tovex
TR-2, manufactured by the DuPont Company, which
described Tovex TR-2 as “one of the safest explosives on
the market.” Before the decision to use Tovex on the house,
the Philadelphia Police Department secretly tested different
explosives on lumber structures; however, Tovex TR-2 was not
meant for above-ground buildings but was instead developed
primarily for underground mining. The media began to use
the DuPont Company’s label of Tovex as an extremely safe
explosive to push the idea that the fire was not the fault of the
city. Mayor Goode took issue with the word “bomb” as well,
explaining that “what [he] approved to be used was an entry
device, which was to take and somehow remove the bunker
from the top of the house. There was no intent to destroy the
house.” The city attempted to paint MOVE as the aggressor,
thereby framing the actions they had undertaken as merely
providing law and order, despite it being clear that the
aggression towards MOVE was excessive.17
Shortly after the bombing, and amid calls for an official
investigation into the administration’s actions, Mayor Goode
announced his intentions to create a special commission to
examine the incident. William J. Green, Mayor Goode’s
predecessor, said the MOVE Special Commission “has
serious, tough questions to ask [the] administration about how
it conducted itself,” and “there are many, many unanswered
questions and in some cases contradictions that cannot and
should not and must not, if faith is to be restored, be swept
under the rug.” The former mayor also said the city should
release the police intelligence files on MOVE so “everyone
in Philadelphia would know what the premise of [the]
decisions were.” Despite Green’s harsh words on the city’s
actions, Robert S. Hurst, then-president of Lodge 5 of the
16 Infield, Carvajal, and Terry, “MOVE Letter Threatened Fire.”
17 Wolf, Marimow, Lopez, and Woestendiek, “How the Bomb Decision Was
Made”; Infield, Carvajal, and Terry, “MOVE Letter Threatened.”
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Fraternal Order of Police, said “the ultimate responsibility of
the widespread property destruction remains squarely on the
members of this terrorist organization known as MOVE,”
and public opinion in Philadelphia supported this idea. In
a poll conducted by Teichner Associates of Philadelphia, 71
percent of respondents believed the mayor did a good or
excellent job dealing with MOVE.18
The MOVE Special Commission hired several people to
conduct the investigation. James R. Phelan, one of the FBI’s
explosive and counterespionage experts before he left the
bureau two years earlier, and Charles King, an expert in
the cause and spread of fires, were brought in to investigate
the explosives used in the bombing. The original report on
the explosive device indicated the only explosive used was
Tovex TR-2. However, three months after the incident,
Officer William C. Klein testified he had included a second
explosive, C-4, in the device when he had assembled it. The
commission also hired six other investigators to work under
the lead investigator, Neil P. Shanahan. These investigators
came from Connecticut, Chicago, Virginia, and Maryland,
as well as the Philadelphia area. William H. Brown III,
chairman of the commission, said the “search for the
highest-quality, professional investigators [was] long and
wide-ranging.” Brown added these investigators brought “the
skills and expertise essential for the investigation to fulfill
its mandate.” The investigators specialized in anti-terrorist
programs, major violent crime, and homicide. As the inquiry
continued, it became very critical of how the city managed
the MOVE incident.19
As the MOVE Commission’s hearings occurred, the
testimonies began to paint Mayor Goode in an unflattering
light. In his testimony, the mayor portrayed himself as
misinformed and misled by his subordinates, claiming he was
as much a victim as a leader. He depicted himself as a leader
who confirmed the decisions others made. This was odd, as
Goode’s managing style as both city manager and mayor was
very detail oriented. An assistant to the District Attorney,
Bernard L. Siegel, testified before the grand jury that he had
heard “the mayor [say] to the police commissioner, ‘You are
the professional and you need not keep me advised of all
the details.’” When the District Attorney, Ed Rendell, was
asked about this statement, he thought it was “somewhat
unusual for Wilson [Goode]” before adding that the mayor’s
“management style has always been to get involved in all
the significant details.” The hearing revealed the mayor’s
18 Larry Eichel and Robin Clark, “MOVE Death Toll Reaches 11; Goode to
Pick Panel for Probe,” Philadelphia Inquirer, May 16, 1985.
19 Larry Eichel, “MOVE Commission Hires Former FBI Explosives Expert,”
Philadelphia Inquirer, September 6, 1985; Larry Eichel, “Commission Hires 6
Investigators,” Philadelphia Inquirer, July 19, 1985.
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attempts to distance himself from the MOVE incident as
it was occurring by purposefully asking to not get all the
details. This opened Goode up to considerable criticism, the
most significant from former mayor William Green, who
said Goode was pushing a theory of “reverse Nuremberg”
responsibility: he could not be responsible for the incident
because he had only accepted the recommendations from his
subordinates. Charles Bowser, a member of the commission,
criticized Goode in a less direct way, stating “the only
person who had the foggiest notion of what was going to
happen when the bomb dropped was a police lieutenant.”
While these hearings demonstrated there was a major issue
between MOVE and the other residents of the 6200 block
of Osage Avenue, they also showed there had been poor
communication, inaccurate or incomplete intelligence on
the organization, and incompetent leadership.20

An editorial in the Philadelphia Inquirer, written shortly
after the report was released, stated the author “[disagreed]
with those who think Wilson Goode should resign” and
noted Philadelphians should not just judge the mayor on
the MOVE incident, but should instead “judge him on his
entire first term.” Mayor Goode also received support from
his church followers after the report. The Inquirer reported
“more than 250 people […] gathered to pray for Mayor
Goode,” and the Reverend U. O. Ifill Sr. described the
prayer services as “a demonstration of the endemic support
the mayor has in the black community.” Despite the findings
of the MOVE Special Commission, Mayor Goode’s support
in the city stayed strong and grew thanks to these efforts by
local organizations and newspapers. This outcry of support
for the mayor hid the actions he had taken and lessened the
loss of life in the most important event of his career.22

When the MOVE Special Commission reached a decision
on the actions of the administration and the police, its
report stated Mayor Goode and his administration displayed
“reckless disregard for life and property.” The report
stated, “dropping a bomb on an occupied row house was
unconscionable and should have been rejected out of hand,”
and “the plan to drop the bomb was reckless, ill-conceived,
and hastily approved.” Commissioner Gregore Sambor and
Managing Director Leo A. Brooks were declared “grossly
negligent” for not calling off the siege. The report also
called the mayor “grossly negligent” and said he “clearly
risked the lives” of the children who had been killed in the
house and this was “unjustified homicide.” The commission
found that the mayor “failed to perform his responsibility
as the city’s chief executive by not actively participating in
the preparation, review, and oversight of the plan.” Goode
“abdicated his responsibilities as a leader when, after midday,
he permitted a clearly failed operation to continue [at] great
risk to life and property.” Despite believing MOVE to be
an “authoritarian, violence-threatening cult,” the report
declared the 10,000 rounds of ammunition fired into the
row house had been “excessive and unreasonable,” and “the
failure of those responsible for the firing to control or stop
such an excessive amount of force was unconscionable,”
especially with children inside the building.21

Despite the findings of the MOVE
Special Commission, Mayor
Goode’s support in the city
stayed strong.

Mayor Goode After MOVE
The MOVE Special Commission’s harsh criticisms of Mayor
Goode were labeled as devastating by allies of the mayor, but
the newspaper coverage of the report was largely supportive.
20 Larry Eichel, “D.A.: Goode Wanted No Details; Rendell Testifies on MOVE,”
Philadelphia Inquirer, October 23, 1985.
21 Thomas Ferrick Jr., “Report on MOVE Finds Goode ‘Grossly Negligent’ in
Decisions: Children’s ‘Homicide’ Is Alleged,” Philadelphia Inquirer, March 2, 1986.

In the years after the MOVE disaster, Wilson Goode’s
reputation began to recover. Over a year after the MOVE
incident, Goode said that “[he] had some difficult days and
difficult times in [his] administration, but [he had] done a
lot of good, constructive things.” John F. White Jr., a city
councilman, said “the administration has demonstrated far
more experience over [the] year.” The incident faded from
public memory, overshadowed by Goode’s more successful
endeavors, such as ending a strike involving 14,000 city
employees, which created more confidence in him and his
administration. When the city experienced a major trash
and sanitation issue, Mayor Goode proposed a trash-tosteam plant to be built in the Philadelphia Navy Yard. When
several police officers were arrested on bribery and corruption
charges, Mayor Goode helped restore the department by
implementing a reform package. In the initial aftermath of
the MOVE disaster, it seemed that Goode’s political career
was over, but over the following two years he worked tirelessly
to repair his image.23

22 Acel Moore, “Bringing on the Problems: Wilson Goode Sometimes Is His
Own Worst Enemy,” Philadelphia Inquirer, March 20, 1986; Russell Cooke,
“Praying for Goode: The Faithful Rise Up,” Philadelphia Inquirer, April 13, 1986.
23 Russell Cooke, “For Goode, A Year of Recovery,” Philadelphia Inquirer,
January 4, 1987; Robin Clark, “Police Reforms Unveiled: Goode Begins Search
for Chief,” Philadelphia Inquirer, November 20, 1985; Ferrick Jr., “Report on
MOVE.”
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In 1988, Goode ran for reelection against former mayor and
police commissioner Frank Rizzo. It was a highly contested
election, with only a slim margin of 17,176 votes out of
652,307 total votes. In Rizzo’s concession, he warned Goode
that he would “have to deliver or [he is] going to be right
on him.” Despite the bad publicity that his actions against
MOVE had brought him, the good publicity he had received
since allowed Goode to rehabilitate his image and beat Rizzo
to become mayor for his second term. Goode’s reelection
shows how successfully MOVE and the MOVE bombing
had been removed from the public eye; even though nothing
truly changed after the bombing, people had moved on.24

Thirty Years Later
Thirty years after the MOVE bombing, National Public
Radio looked back at MOVE and learned that many young
Philadelphians never even knew it had occurred. Tasneema
Raja, an editor on an NPR show who grew up only twenty
minutes north of Philadelphia, never learned about MOVE
in class but instead learned about it from her father.
NPR’s Gene Demby, who grew up in South Philadelphia
in the 1980s, also never discussed MOVE in class. Robin
Wagner-Pacifici, who studies fringe radical groups at New
York City’s New School, believes that other radical groups
never identified with MOVE’s anti-technology, pro-animal
rights, and quasi-Rastafarian beliefs, leading the group to be
forgotten in discussions of radical groups. Groups similar to
the Branch Davidians in Waco, Texas, and the Weaver family
in Ruby Ridge, Idaho, held overlapping beliefs and would
mention each other in their manifestos, but “none of them
mentioned MOVE.” Unlike the Branch Davidians who
faced off against the Department of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms, or the Weaver Family who were besieged by the
FBI, the Philadelphia police department bombed MOVE.
This was not a showdown between a fringe radical group and
the federal government, but with the local government. A
lack of connection between the general public and MOVE’s
core beliefs, as well as the city’s general ambivalence toward
the group, caused the MOVE bombing to fade into obscurity.
MOVE generally has only one article written on it each year,
usually on the anniversary of the bombing or about the
MOVE 9, and only receives minor mention in articles about
events the group attends. This relative obscurity compared
to the other extremist groups has caused the fallout of the
bombing to be forgotten.25
24 Christopher Hepp and H. G. Bissinger, “Rizzo Concedes Defeat: Says He’ll Remain
Active in Politics,” Philadelphia Inquirer, November 24, 1987.
25 Gene Demby, “I’m From Philly. 30 Years Later, I’m Still Trying to Make Sense of
the MOVE Bombing,” National Public Radio, May 13, 2015, https://www.npr.org/sections/
codeswitch/2015/05/13/406243272/im-from-philly-30-years-later-im-still-trying-to-makesense-of-the-move-bombing. Gene Demby, “Why Have So Many People Never Heard o f
the MOVE Bombing?” National Public Radio, May 18, 2015, https://www.npr.org/sections/
codeswitch/2015/05/18/407665820/why-did-we-forget-the-move-bombing.
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Conclusion

Goode’s victory over Rizzo for a second term as mayor was
the first sign that the MOVE incident held minimal lasting
significance to the city outside of Osage Avenue. The second
sign was that schools in Philadelphia do not teach about
MOVE; children living in Philadelphia do not learn about
an event where the mayor bombs his own city. The MOVE
bombing should have ended Wilson Goode’s political career,
as well as the careers of the others involved in the decisionmaking that led to the siege of the MOVE row house and
subsequent bombing of its bunker. This should have been an
event woven into the very fabric of the city; instead, it was
forgotten—the perpetrators remained in office and repaired
their image, and their victims faded into obscurity. Nothing
significant changed after the MOVE bombing: there were no
major changes to policy or regulations in response to MOVE
or police actions, and for the residents of Osage Avenue all
they received was a city bombing their homes.26

This should have been an event
woven into the very fabric of the
city; instead, it was forgotten.
The MOVE bombing is an enormous black spot in the
history of Philadelphia, and yet its occurrence is rarely, if
ever, mentioned. That the bombing held no lasting impact
in the psyche of Philadelphia is an affront to the deaths of
those eleven MOVE members. Despite two grand juries
on the bombing, no one from the city administration ever
faced any consequences resulting from their part in burning
down sixty-one houses and killing eleven people, five of
them children. The city administration did their best to
rehabilitate their image and move past the bombing without
suffering any consequences, aside from a lawsuit paid to
the surviving MOVE members. Reports of the MOVE
bombing began as highly critical but over time became
supportive, enabling the administration to shift the blame
for the bomb and subsequent fire onto MOVE, eventually
leading to the reelection of Wilson Goode and allowing
the MOVE bombing to become largely forgotten. That the
MOVE bombing left no major lasting effect on the city of
Philadelphia is a disgrace and a disservice to those whose
homes burned in the blaze and those who perished as a result
of the city’s actions.

26 The homeowners on Osage Avenue had their homes rebuilt, but now most
are abandoned due to shoddy reconstruction.
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Collective Identity in Germany
An Assessment of National Theories
Sean Starkweather

“Köln stellt sich quer - Tanz die AfD” by Elke Witzig is licensed under CC BY-SA-4.0

Beginning in the 18th century, the question of what makes a nation has occupied a prominent place in German
politics. From the national theories of the 18th-century German Romantics, who identified cultural and ethnic
factors as being the key determinants, to modern civic nationalists and postnationalists, who point to liberal civic
values and institutions, the importance of collective identity and how it is oriented has remained an important
topic for German scholars and policymakers. Using survey research, I assess the accuracy and relevance of these
theories in contemporary German society. I find that, contrary to the optimism of modern thinkers, German
collective identity remains aligned with the national theories of the Romantics, resulting in ethnic discrimination
and heightened fears over the loss of culture through external ideological and ethnic sources.
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The potent force of nationalism has deep roots in German
history. From the first conceptualizations of a singular
nation by the German Romantics to unification and the
1871 constitution to the post-reunification era, the manner
in which Germans have perceived themselves as a nation
has played a vital role in both domestic and international
politics. But while nationalism in the eras of Johann Gottfried
Herder and Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Otto von Bismarck, and
Adolf Hitler are generally well understood, the character of
contemporary German nationalism remains a topic of much
debate. While there have always been fringe nationalist
parties like the National Democratic Party (NDP), they
remained just that: parties on the fringes of public thought.
Indeed, the NDP has never succeeded in passing the voting
threshold of 5% needed to enter the Bundestag parliament
in federal elections (“September 24,” 2017). However,
a surge in nationalist sentiments since 2013 threatens the
multicultural society Germany has nurtured for 75 years.
This surge has been most associated with the rapid rise of
the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party following the
European debt crisis that began in late 2009. During the
eurozone crisis, five European Union member states—Spain,
Portugal, Ireland, Cyprus, and most notably, Greece—
experienced extremely high budget deficits and public debt,
triggering a sovereign debt crisis that threatened financial
institutions and the economic stability of the eurozone in
its entirety, including Germany (“The Eurozone in Crisis,”
2015). The AfD received just under 5% of the vote in the
2013 federal elections, which led many to speculate that
the party would implode soon after its conception (“Will
Germany’s,” 2013). Yet, despite initial failure, the AfD
shocked both policymakers and opponents in the 2017
federal elections by receiving almost 12.6% of the vote to
become one of the largest parties in Germany (Clarke, 2017).
This new phase in German politics begs the following
questions: does the AfD’s rise to prominence reflect a
deeper trend in how Germans perceive themselves as a
national community? Or is the AfD’s recent electoral
success simply a notable but ultimately temporary setback
to regionalist and internationalist ends? After all, 12.6% of
the vote is still not close at all to the combined 53.4% that
the Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU) and
Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) received, and
is nowhere near a majority (Clarke, 2017). These questions
have become especially pertinent in the wake of the February
19, 2020, terrorist attack in Hanau, Germany. The attack
was carried out by a right-wing extremist whose xenophobia
led him to target two shisha bars that the Turkish community

frequented before killing his mother and himself (Kaschel,
2020). The shootings that saw the tragic deaths of ten
people—nine had an immigrant background, and the tenth
was the perpetrator’s mother—have brought these questions
regarding German collective identity to the forefront of
public discourse (Kaschel, 2020).

A surge in nationalist sentiments
since 2013 threatens the
multicultural society Germany
has nurtured for 75 years.
In recent scholarship, Allen (2010) argued that Germans
have shifted away from an ethnocentric view of national
identity towards a cultural and civic one, and Bassey
(2012) expanded on that argument in noting the formative
role that the German state has played in constructing this
more cultural and civic conception of the nation. More
famously, both Dolf Sternberger and Jürgen Habermas
have presented theories of constitutional patriotism, which
grounds collective identity in the shared norms, values,
and procedures constructed through a liberal-democratic
constitution. They have rejected the relevance of a national
identity, arguing that it will be or has been replaced by a
postnational one following World War II. Their optimism
towards a shift in collective German identity has been shared
by previous administrations and, hesitantly, by the current
government headed by Chancellor Angela Merkel.
In contrast to these perceptions, Connor (1994) asserted
that traditional German nationalism will inevitably show
increasing signs of recovery and that the “obituaries for
ethnonationalism have proved immature” (p. 181). To clarify,
Connor did not believe that German ethnonationalism
would be akin to the racially driven chauvinism that defined
the Nazi epoch, but acknowledged parallels. Other scholars
have gone further, suggesting that German nationalism
has adopted a more ethnocentric form that has become
increasingly prominent; the Brookings Institution even
published a policy brief on the new threat posed by the AfD’s
apparent ethnonationalism (Stelzenmüller, 2019).
These approaches cannot adequately account for the
resurgence of nationalism in Germany. In this paper,
I examine arguments that the form of nationalism in
contemporary Germany is of a strictly cultural, civic, or
ethnic nature, and I work to understand the state’s role in
inducing such beliefs. I begin by describing the philosophical
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frameworks of the Romantics and modern theorists. Later,
I present my argument that German neo-nationalism has
taken on an ethnocultural form that harkens back to the
German Romantics and the theories relating to postnational
identities are mistaken. To support these claims, I utilize
quantitative and qualitative sources, including voting
statistics, opinion polls, statements and speeches by various
government officials, and insights provided by scholars. These
approaches position me to assess the nature of Germany’s
neo-nationalism and the validity of its narrower conceptions.

A History of
German Nationalism
Theoretical Roots

The study of nationalism can very well be nebulous, so
defining a “nation” at its base is important in approaching
the question of German nationalism with some clarity.
Plano and Olton (1969) defined a nation as “a social group
which shares a common ideology, common institutions and
customs, and a sense of homogeneity. . . . [T]here is also
present a strong group sense of belonging associated with
a particular territory considered to be peculiarly its own”
(as cited in Connor, 1994, p. 92). In his seminal Imagined
Communities, Anderson (1983) helped shape how scholars
frame questions on nationalism by offering a good starting
point. He defined the nation as “an imagined political
community—and imagined as both inherently limited and
sovereign” (p. 6). This imagined community is limited on
the basis that “even the largest of them . . . has finite, if
elastic, boundaries” and sovereign because “nations dream of
being free. . . . [T]he gage and emblem of this freedom is the
sovereign state” (p. 7). With these insights, we can synthesize
a definition: a nation is a porous, perceived community
whose members believe they share a sense of commonness
intimately tied to a certain territory. Whether this perception
accurately describes contemporary nationalism and the birth
of the new international order will be assessed.
Johann Gottfried Herder and Johann Gottlieb Fichte were
among the first to create theories of German nationalism.
Herder’s transfiguration of the concept of a Volk [people] in
his 1784 Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit
[Ideas for the Philosophy of Human History] was compelling
and acted as a “radiation-point” around which the “new
gospel of nationalism” revolved (Hayes, 1927, p. 722). For
Herder, the Volk derived not through race or ethnicity, but
through the culture that one inherits as a result of being
within a particular environment (Hayes, 1927). His idea of
an environment can be broken down to three fundamental
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factors: physical geography, historical development, and
folk-character. Although Herder failed to provide a precise
definition of folk-character, it can best be described as the
overarching, generalized personality of a particular national
group. He argued that the natural state of humanity entails
that a single nation should maintain a single national culture
and, as Charles Taylor (1994) pointed out, that “a Volk
should be true to itself ” (p. 31). In other words, a nation
ought to preserve the integrity of its culture.
With regards to the ideal of authenticity, Herder asserted
that the Church, in advocating for the continued use of
specialized Latin, inhibited forms of expression through
local vernaculars. This, in turn, inhibited the nation from
realizing its true self (Schmidt, 1957). On a side note, the
popularity of Herder’s thought lends merit to Anderson’s
suggestion that the specialization of Latin played a role in
bringing about national consciousnesses that diametrically
opposed encompassing religious communities.

Although Fichte defined the
nation in terms of language and
general culture at a superficial
level, his theory ultimately
rested on ethnicity.
While Herder stated explicitly that he spoke of culture in a
broad sense, there is some disagreement regarding Fichte’s
arguments as to what made the nation. It is commonly
believed that Fichte’s 1808 Reden an die deutsche Nation
[Addresses to the German Nation] merely narrowed the scope
of Herder’s theory in that Fichte saw the purity of the native
language, a cultural artifact, determined a national identity
(Martyn, 1997). Although Fichte defined the nation in
terms of language and general culture at a superficial level,
his theory ultimately rested on ethnicity. His appeals to
Abstammung and Abkunft [descent and origin] occupied a
prominent place in his thought, especially in his Reden. And
though he officially rejected shared language as the principal
component of a national identity, Fichte’s consistent references
to descent and origin betrayed his explicit denunciations
of shared blood (Abizadeh, 2005). Indeed, according to
Abizadeh (2005), Fichte’s call for die ursprüngliche Sprache
des Stammvolkes [the original language of one’s ancestral
people] when speaking on the expressive freedom of a nation
was inseparable from genealogical purity. As Abizadeh noted,
“Language must indeed coincide with descent” (p. 354). The
twin ideas of a history and ancestry common to all Germans
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are therefore components of Fichte’s theory of nationalism,
regardless of whether he acknowledged it or even desired it.
Language only constituted a component of the theory, not
its entirety. Although Fichte did not offer an ethnonational
historiography for the German people, the idea of an
ancestral bond between all Germans was compelling, and
his work would be invoked by future German nationalists,
particularly the traditional conservatives and the Nazis
during the Weimar Republic. Hence, many historians have
attributed the fervor with which the Nazis pursued their
ambitions to theorists like Fichte (e.g., Kaufmann, 1942).
The German Romantics’ concept of the nation rested on an
ethnocultural foundation. Though Herder’s approach rested
on a broad culture, Fichte provided a more precise argument
as to what gave life to the nation and what differentiates
it from other nations by emphasizing people’s ancestral
history. However, whether the Romantics were accurate in
describing the essence of nations can only be determined
when contrasted with modern conceptions.

Modern Theories of Nationalism

While ethnocultural theories of nationalism found favor
among academic circles prior to the conclusion of World War
II, the end of the war in 1945 and the beginning of the Cold
War brought forth a number of theories positing that nations
are defined in civic terms. To modern theorists, nations derive
from the idea that “political attachment ought to centre on
the norms, the values and, more indirectly, the procedures
of a liberal democratic constitution” rather than less tangible
notions of culture, ethnicity, and language (Müller &
Scheppele, 2008, p. 67). The division of the German state
into the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) on the west and
the German Democratic Republic on the east spawned two
distinct theories of constitutional patriotism: the “protective”
patriotism of Dolf Sternberger, which emphasized the
physical structure of a nation, and the “purifying” patriotism
of Jürgen Habermas, which emphasized its ethical structure
(Müller, 2006). These theories stemmed from a series of
lectures given by Karl Jaspers in 1946 wherein he argued that
German solidarity could be found only in reflecting on their
involvement in World War II and the Holocaust.
It was from the insights offered by Jaspers that Sternberger
constructed his theory of Verfassungspatriotismus [constitutional patriotism] (Bagchi, 2016). Sternberger argued that
collective identity should derive from the institutions of the
democratic state and the general concept of the rule of law.
As Müller (2006) pointed out, this argument depended on a
“‘militant democracy’ capable of defending itself against its

internal and external enemies” (p. 284). Having witnessed
the Weimar Republic’s collapse and the fragmentation of
German society into rigidly defined factions, he saw this
political attachment to the state as necessary for social
cohesion and stability (Müller, 2006). The idea that there are
enemies that the state must be defended against suggests that
he was not idealistic enough so as to embrace cosmopolitan
notions of identity. Rather, Sternberger’s theory danced
between the ethnocentric chauvinism of nationalism
on the one hand and the idealistic internationalism of
cosmopolitanism (Kobyliński, 2017). He saw the primary
role of politics as the eternal push towards peace and his
constitutional patriotism as the vehicle by which it could be
achieved in a democratic state. To emphasize the plausibility
of his theory, he offered an interpretation of history positing
that traditional European states had been characterized by the
presence of constitutional patriotism, particularly Germany
under Chancellor Otto von Bismarck.

For Sternberger, the Holocaust
brought about the collective
emotional conditions that
would push society towards
constitutional patriotism.
Sternberger employed arguments that made use of the
Jaspersian concept of “metaphysical guilt,” which referred
to the fracturing of solidarity that Jaspers saw across human
beings and the collective responsibility Germans felt after
the Holocaust (Müller, 2006, p. 280). For Sternberger, the
Holocaust brought about the collective emotional conditions
that would push society towards constitutional patriotism.
Considering the historical precedent and the situation of
German society, the shift back to constitutional patriotism
following the divergent path that the state took in the 1930s
and 1940s was, in Sternberger’s eyes, likely and perhaps
inevitable after 1945 (Kobyliński, 2017, p. 47).
Jürgen Habermas’s theory of constitutional patriotism was
inspired by but diverged from Sternberger’s at a fundamental
level. Unsurprisingly, Habermas’s theory reflected the new
optimism that had swept Europe’s intelligentsia in the late
stages of the Cold War: instead of grounding collective
identity with the state and the physical institutions
associated with it, Habermas pinned his theory on the
liberal political principles and values embedded within a
constitution (Kobyliński, 2017). He believed that a return to
the pre-national patriotism espoused by Sternberger was not
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even possible given recent history. Rather, using Lawrence
Kohlberg’s theory of moral development, he conceived that
individuals would develop “post-conventional identities” in
which they would construct reasoned moral philosophies
and abide by them honestly (Müller, 2006). It is here that
Habermas’s theory maintains a rationalist line of thought:
the restructuring of the traditional German state to adhere
to the Rechtsstaat [rule of law] and the Sozialstaat [welfare
state] would enable people to engage in the public sphere so
they can reason with one another as free individuals (Müller,
2006). The rule of law would push a substantive view of what
constituted universal norms and protect democratic processes,
and the welfare state would provide the material conditions
necessary for individuals to engage in such democratic
processes as equals. Habermas then focused on the question
of German guilt, and it is in the controversy surrounding
how best to handle this guilt that the question of the nature
of German nationalism takes root; this controversy came to
be known as the Historikerstreit [historian’s dispute].

For Habermas, the Holocaust
was a lesson for humanity as a
whole, and German guilt could
lead to an identity based on a
common sense of humanity.
In contrast to more conservative thinkers, Habermas
regarded arguments that the only way to establish a stronger
collective German identity was to embrace a “moderate or
accepting view of the Holocaust” as simply old-nationalistic
(Menent, 2018). For Habermas, the Holocaust was a lesson
for humanity as a whole, and German guilt could lead to
an identity based on a common sense of humanity that
transcended the forms of identity seen earlier in the century.
Thus, the German nation would hardly be a nation at all, but
rather a social group of people unified by shared liberal values
and a public sphere where they could engage in politics. The
factors once believed to help establish a nation—like common
language, history, and ancestry—were thus nonfactors in
Habermas’s view, at least in the post-war era. To him, the
diminishing importance of traditional national identities
would lend itself to European integration, for there would
be a particular good common to different communities in
the form of a shared legal system (Menent, 2018).
Though Habermas’s later attempts to extend his theory to
all of Europe and incorporate the possibility of a European
identity has faced much more criticism among scholars, it
continues to find support in the post-war era and has been
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adopted by a number of eager, idealistic European politicians
committed to the idea of a regional community bound
together by liberal democratic values.
To recapitulate, the 20th century has seen the emergence of
theories of constitutional patriotism that reject conventional,
traditional conceptions of national identity associated with
the German Romantics and Nazi ethnonationalists. Instead,
these modern theories of collective identities are grounded in
either concrete ideas pertaining to the state or abstract ones
pertaining to liberal democratic values. These theories gained
traction in the late 20th century, and while many have since
been disillusioned, they remain prominent as a consequence
of recent German policy and the perceived potential in the
EU’s ability to nurture a transcendent European identity. In
2016, Minister of Foreign Affairs Heiko Maas even stated that
“[Germany] has a murky past, but our parents’ generation
has created a modern Germany: cosmopolitan and liberal
domestically, good neighbors and peaceful partners abroad”
(Brady, 2016). It is apparent that a civic postnational view
remains influential, at least within the state. For these
modern theories to be determinedly accurate, there must be
evidence demonstrating that German guilt has maintained
its resilience as a social phenomenon and cultural or ethnic
differences are marginal factors that have little to no effect in
interactions between individuals.
Although the idea that the end of history had been reached
is not nearly as promising as it once had been, and political
theorists like Habermas and government officials concede
that there remain a number of challenges that regional
institutions like the EU must face, they are firm in their
belief that the advent of postnational societies or civic-based
nations is imminent. Many western European countries have
pursued a form of regionalism wherein national identities are
superseded by a broader European identity, but no country
has pursued this ideal with more fervor than Germany. From
the outset, the new FRG under Chancellor Konrad Adenauer
has adopted a foreign policy of Westbindung [binding of
the West], sowing the seeds for a long-term project of
incorporating the people into a greater European collective.
Currently, many believe that this project has begun seeing
success or at least managed to nurture a national identity
predicated on civic elements. This is seen most clearly in a
statement by Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Germany’s longestserving foreign minister: “the more European our foreign
policy is, the more national it is” (as cited in Kirchick, 2018).
While I disagree with Genscher’s assessment, the arguments
presented in its defense speak to the complexity of the
questions being addressed.
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Questioning German Guilt

Modern theorists have pointed to German guilt as the catalyst for a new constitutional patriotism that would replace
the traditional form of nationalism. This position is reasonable considering that Germany experienced a period of nearly complete suppression of nationalist sentiments by both
the government and the general public in the years immediately following World War II (Berlin, 2003). The tragedies
brought about by Hitler’s regime—a regime many supported
or were sympathetic to—diminished all traces of nationalism in German society (Breuilly, 1992). However, the initial
absence of national sentiments may not preclude a later rise
of nationalism and nationalistic behavior. If this is the case,
does German guilt ensure that nationalism will permanently
remain at the fringes of political life?
Allen (2010) pointed to the failure of the “New Right” in
procuring significant support among the general population
as one indication of the German people’s shift away from
an ethnocentric view of the Volk. While believing in overtly
positive responses to these questions may have been reasonable, Connor (1994) provides an argument that tempers the
implications of Allen’s (2010) claim:
Germans [had] held their ethnonational proclivities
in tight rein. But as memories recede, as the realization grows that Nazism and German nationalism
are not inevitably synonymous, as pride of postwar
material and cultural achievements takes on the hue
of pride in German achievements, as older Germans
come to believe that Germany’s period of atonement
and parole has lasted long enough, and as a postwar
generation that believes it cannot be held in any way
culpable for the mistakes of its parents comes into
power, German nationalism manifests commensurate signs of recovery. (p. 181)
Because the initial disappearance of German nationalism was
the product of German guilt, there is a finitude that characterizes the suppression of nationalism. Specifically, the
temporal aspect of this suppression, which has involved the
voluntary participation of the people under the state, is such
that time nullifies the effects of German guilt. Thus, when
Alexander Gauland, then an AfD candidate for the Bundestag, stated that Germans “have the right to be proud of
the achievements of the German soldiers in two world wars”
and when AfD’s chief in Thuringia Björn Höcke declared the
Holocaust memorial in Berlin a “monument of shame” and
called for a “180-degree turnaround” with regards to German

guilt, the responses were not a unified outcry against such
sentiments being clearly nationalistic, but a mixed batter of
utter outrage, sympathy, and agreement (as cited in Dearden
2017; as cited in Huggler, 2017). Höcke later clarified that
the Holocaust “is part of our history. But it is only part of our
history” and that “guilt consciousness alone cannot create a
healthy identity, but only a broken one” (as cited in “Fury
as AfD,” 2017). Yet even his clarification directs attention
to the problem of German national identity as it relates to
the feelings of guilt, and more importantly, it hints towards
the temporal aspect of guilt. As time passes, events fade into
the backdrop of history, and the tragedies once believed to
be embedded within the German character become dulled
within the memories of the German people.

While the New Right may have
been at the fringe earlier, it is
presently a powerful force to be
reckoned with.
Consequently, the state’s attempts at forcing public conscious reflection have been met with increasing confusion
and resentment. A divide exists between the state’s perception of how the German nation ought to be defined
and the perception held by many of its people. Although
Allen (2010) was correct in asserting that Germans have
shifted away from a strictly ethnocentric understanding
of the nation, his implicit conclusion that shared history plays no role does not account for the time factor,
which cannot be ignored considering the emotive nature
of guilt. The rapid rise in popularity of the AfD lends
merit to this idea, for the relative weakness of right-wing
parties in the early 21st century has, over the course of a
decade, shifted into relative strength. The AfD is seen as
an ever-increasing threat by the left-wing and moderate
parties, especially after the 2017 federal election. While
the New Right may have been at the fringe earlier, it is
presently a powerful force to be reckoned with.

A Popular Nationalism

What are the reasons for the feelings of disenfranchisement
and concern that led to the rise of popular nationalist parties
like the AfD? To what extent do they speak to the nature of
Germans’ view of the Volk? Some scholars point to economic
factors, such as low income and unemployment, as being
responsible for increases in nationalist sentiments (Hill,
2017; Staudenmeier, 2017). Unfortunately, these factors do
not adequately explain the increase in support for the AfD
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and certainly not the revival of nationalism. To determine
the underlying factors, it is necessary to analyze public
opinion in a broader sense, and polling and survey data offer
good windows of opportunity for determining the content of
German collective identity. In analyzing this data, notions of
a German nation predicated on civic values and institutions
begin to fall apart, and the reality of an ethnocultural
conception of the nation becomes more evident.

Surveying “Germanness”

Language and religion are typically seen as the cornerstones
of German culture, although the arts occupy a clear place as
well. It may be pointed out that Catholic-Protestant divisions
contradict the notion that religious affiliation is a primary
binding factor; however, this superficial divide is superseded
by a general sense of shared faith in Christianity in the face
of the perceived threat of Islam. One of the most significant
concerns held by Germans is the “loss of culture, values, and
the way of life we grew up with”: in 2017, 19% believed that
it was the greatest threat to the future of their children, and
95% of those who voted for the AfD believed that Germany
would experience a real loss of culture (Center for Insights in
Survey Research, 2017; “Umfragen zur AfD,” 2017).

The issues that Germans value
reveal how the AfD grew its
voter base so rapidly in
just four years.
This perceived danger can, to an extent, be seen as stemming
from the influx of Muslim refugees since 2015. Notably, 16%
of respondents in a Center for Insights in Survey Research
(2017) poll saw the refugee crisis as the biggest problem facing
Germany and 20% believed it was the biggest issue facing
Europe as a whole. Another survey found that 71% of all
respondents were in favor of limiting the number of refugees
in the long run, and 79% felt more needed to be done to
integrate refugees (“Umfragen zur Flüchtlingspolitik,” 2017).
It should be noted that 54% of respondents believed that
the refugees were an enrichment for the country (“Umfragen
zur Flüchtlingspolitik,” 2017). Still, 57% of all survey
respondents and 92% of Afd supporters were worried that
the influence of Islam was too strong (“Umfragen zur AfD,”
2017; “Umfragen zur Flüchtlingspolitik,” 2017). Perhaps
due in part to this perception, 52% of Germans either
entertained the idea or were in favor of a “dominant culture”
(“Over 50% of Germans,” 2017). Given that a significant
portion of those who voted for a left-wing or center party
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in the 2013 elections switched affiliations and voted for
the AfD in 2017—of the nearly 6 million votes that the
AfD received in 2017, over 1 million of those votes came
from those who voted for the CDU in 2013—the issues
that Germans value reveal how the AfD grew its voter base
so rapidly in just four years (Burn-Murdoch et al., 2017).
Considering that the AfD desires cultural preservation and
calls for the government to actively protect German culture
as the “predominant culture” in its “Manifesto for Germany,”
it is reasonable to presume that those concerned with the loss
of German culture may feel the pull-factor of the AfD and
the push-factor of what they perceive as the negligence of
the parties they voted for in earlier elections (Alternative für
Deutschland, 2017; Center for Insights in Survey Research,
2017; Holscher et al., 2017).
The array of survey data suggests that the sentiments and
policy prescriptions typically attributed to the AfD and other
far right-wing groups are much more prevalent than believed.
Cultural artifacts remain vital components of German
collective identity. Germany’s neo-nationalism, therefore,
cannot be condemned out of hand as simply a radical
ideology maintained by fringe movements. Rather, it must
be recognized as a genuine reaction to a perceived sudden
shift in the normative social dynamics that characterize
German life.
It is important to note that Germans seem not in favor
of rejecting or deporting all incoming refugees, but of
expediting the process of deporting asylum seekers who have
already been rejected. Additionally, Germans are willing to
accommodate refugees insofar as the refugees are willing to
integrate into society. This willingness is marked by a general
acceptance of institutional methods for integrating and
potentially assimilating refugees among other immigrants.
In a recent survey, 76% of Germans without a migrant
background agreed that immigrants ought to “adapt their
behavior to German culture,” and 83% with a migrant
background responded the same way (Chase, 2016). Though
the disparity is not too great, it suggests, as Federal Minister
Peter Altmaier stated, that the desire to assimilate on the part
of immigrants in a broad sense is “abundantly and distinctly
present” (as cited in Chase, 2016). Even though this data
demonstrably undermines the postnationalist vision, it also
shows the cultural aspects that underlie “Germanness.”

Immigration

While the proposition that German neo-nationalism has assumed the ethnocultural trappings of Herder and Fichte as
it did in the late 18th and early 19th centuries can be argued

2019-2020 / Volume 7
simply on grounds of general public opinion, it is in studying the real dynamics between ethnic Germans and those
with migrant backgrounds on a more intimate level that the
nature of neo-nationalism in Germany becomes more apparent. Both steady flows and sudden influxes of immigrants
are nothing new to Germany. As Bade (1995) observed,
“since the late nineteenth century, transatlantic emigration
from Germany has decreased while continental labor immigration has increased” (p. 515). More relevantly, Goodman
(2007) asserts that “the postwar story of German economic
and social change has been very much informed, possibly
dominated, by de facto immigration” (p. 100). Indeed, the
Wirtschaftswunder [economic miracle] of the 1950s led to labor shortages that required the FRG to pursue policies that
encouraged immigration of Turkish Gastarbeiter [guest workers]. But there is a major difference between immigration into
Germany in the late 19th century and in the postwar era: in
the former period, the government reacted in a hostile manner to the influx of early immigrants, especially in Prussia
(Bade, 1995). It was during this time that Germany was led
from ethnocultural to ethnonational conceptions of the nation as the government of the late 19th century “bound civil
rights to the principle of ethnic descent,” thereby reaffirming
jus sanguinis [the principle of ethnic heritage] (Bade, 1995,
p. 522). By extension, the emphasis on ethnic background in
relation to questions of citizenship laid the groundwork for
the ethnic nationalist fervor that took Germany by storm in
the 1930s through the outspoken rhetoric of politicians like
Heinrich von Treitschke and, of course, Hitler.
In contrast, immigration in the postwar era was encouraged
by the FRG, even after reunification in 1990. Yet, despite the
state’s genuine and commendable attempts to bring about a
new age of multiculturalism and define the German nation in
terms of civic values and democratic institutions, the public
has nonetheless been much more reserved. The case of the
Turkish population provides a rich instance in this regard.

Integration

The FRG does not track race in its census. However,
independent analyses have been conducted that involve a
number of different variables, like intermarriage, naming
habits, and name-based discrimination. The rate of ethnic
intermarriage is a powerful indicator of a minority’s
assimilation into their new society; it is certainly one of the
most easily observable signs of assimilation as well (Gerhards
& Hans, 2009). It reflects the amount of interaction between
members of different ethnic groups and their willingness to
accept and accommodate one another (Janßen & Schroedter,
2007). According to the Migration Policy Institute (MPI),
the intermarriage rate among first-generation Turkish men

in 2008 was 7.1% and 12.1% for second-generation Turkish
men; first-generation Turkish women had an intermarriage
rate of 2.6% (Nottmeyer, 2009). The MPI even asserted
that the increase in intermarriage between first- and
second-generation Turks in Germany indicated “the second
generation’s greater commitment to and integration into
German society” (Nottmeyer, 2009). Intermarriage rates
between Turks and Germans have, in fact, risen since 2008.
As of 2017, the rate among Turkish women was 14% while
the rate among Turkish men was 19% (“Love in Germany,”
2018). This increase in intermarriages suggests not only
a willingness among the Turkish population in Germany
to integrate, but that there are increasingly more ethnic
Germans willing to accept and accommodate Turks into
German society. This seems to vindicate, to a small degree,
the cosmopolitan claim that Europeans are moving beyond
traditional nationalisms.

Some have wrongly used
these findings to push an antiimmigrant, anti-Muslim rhetoric.
It must also be considered that the ethnic component of
collective identity can potentially detract with regards to
Turkish integration. A 2018 study by the Center for Turkish
Studies at the University of Duisburg-Essen found that 89%
of Turks feel they belong either “strongly” or “very strongly”
in Turkey, greater than the 81% that answered in the same
manner regarding Germany (Sauer, 2018). This dual identity
leads to Ross’s (2009) assertion that “the strong ethnic ties and
identification with the homeland that characterize GermanTurks provide meaning and comfort in daily life, but appear
to impede assimilation” (p. 710). Some have wrongly used
these findings to push an anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim
rhetoric. Kern (2016), for example, emphasized that ethnic
Turks are, on average, “economically and educationally less
successful than other immigrant groups.” Taken alone, this
statement appears to be simply factual. However, when
grouped with survey data that highlight only the negative
elements of the Turkish population in Germany, the result is
a view slanted to enhance a preconceived political ideology,
which neglects the real progress made by German Turks
towards assimilating and integrating. Although it may appear
ethnic Turks are “resisting” assimilation and less inclined
to assimilate compared to other minorities, the Turkish
population’s relative acculturation is roughly equal to other
immigrant populations that originate from countries that are
culturally closer (Gerhards & Hans, 2009). In simpler terms,
as Pokorny (2017) noted,

James Madison Undergraduate Research Journal

43

Hans (2010) shows that the majority of immigrants
do in fact assimilate into German society. The first
generation generally does not assimilate completely, but some members of the second generation become totally assimilated. When it comes to the consumption of high culture, Hans (2015) notes that
third-generation immigrants are no different from
young Germans. (p. 11)
Despite this reality, many Germans have tended to distinguish
themselves from German-Turks, as evidenced by the famous
departure of Mesut Özil from the German national football
team; Özil was quoted as saying, “I am German when we win,
but I am an immigrant when we lose” (as cited in “German
Turks still rooted,” 2018). Inter-ethnocultural relations may
have improved, but there is clearly much progress to be made.

Hyphenation

Although there are a number of modes by which to
demonstrate ethnic socialization between ethnic Turks and
Germans, ethnic acculturation is most simply demonstrated
via naming habits. Gerhards and Hans (2009) found that
while Turks were less likely to give their children German
names, having close interethnic relationships of any kind
with ethnic Germans greatly increased the likelihood that
a Turk would opt for a German name for their child, and
“a high share of Turks married to German partners adopt
naming habits completely in line with ethnic Germans.”
Moreover, given that names are associated with particular
ethnic groups, this also reinforces the idea that there is in
fact a strong ethnic component to collective identities and
how they are developed.
The existence of name-based discrimination is a powerful
indicator of the importance of ethnicity as it relates to identity.
Names have long been an identifier of ethnic background.
In Bosnia, for example, last names specifically were used to
identify friend and foe as the new country collapsed into
civil conflict in the early- to mid-90s (Nye & Welch, 2017).
While name-based exclusionary behavior in Germany is not
nearly as dramatic as in Bosnia, there is strong evidence that
ethnic discrimination against individuals with identifiably
Turkish names still exists in German society, particularly
in schools and the workplace. In schools, Bonefeld and
Dickhäuser (2018) found that “when a student was assumed
to have a migrant background [through names], the dictation
was graded less favorably compared to a student without
a migrant background, namely by 0.3 grade steps” (p. 7).
Bonefeld and Dickhäuser (2018) noted that this disparity is
more likely a result of a positive bias toward students without
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a migrant background than a negative bias towards students
with a migrant background. This bias may play a role in
students with migrant backgrounds attending lower-track
schools compared to native ethnic Germans.

The ethnic component of
collective identities is still
important in how people
interact in German society.
Ethnic discrimination also exists in the workplace. Kaas
and Manger (2012) found that applications marked by an
identifiably German name were 14% more likely to receive
callbacks from larger firms and 24% more likely to receive a
callback from smaller firms than similar applications marked
by an identifiably Turkish name. Again, the name-based
discrimination found in the study was less severe than in other
countries, like Greece against Albanians, Sweden against
Arabs, and the United States against African Americans.
These disparities in how students and applicants are treated
based on their names indicate that the ethnic component of
collective identities is still important in how people interact
in German society (Bonefield & Dickhäuser, 2018).

Conclusion

German neo-nationalism, which has revealed itself gradually
since 2013, has taken on an ethnocultural form that reflects
19th century theories on what constitutes a nation according
to the German Romantics. This is the case despite the
FRG’s attempts to develop a multicultural society in which
German identity is grounded in democratic institutions.
Many politicians, theorists, and laymen alike argue that
ethnocultural conceptions of the nation are anachronistic
in the contemporary era and only the radical segments of
the German population retain such conceptions. By and
large, however, Germans have exhibited great concern as to
the preservation of cultural artifacts, like language, arts, and
religion, which they perceive may be under threat, especially
following the influx of Muslim refugees in recent years.
Ethnicity remains an important part of Germany’s social
dynamics, and judgments about the character of an individual
are still made on the basis of ethnic/migrant background, even
though the practice is not as prevalent as in other countries.
It can therefore be said that German collective identity is not
as firmly grounded in a constitutional patriotism or a form
of postnationalism as many would like to believe. Instead,
German collective identity involves strong cultural and

2019-2020 / Volume 7
ethnic elements that define how Germans view the Volk. This
is reminiscent of the theories of Herder and Fichte that played
important roles in how the 1871 German Constitution was
framed with regards to the national question. The FRG’s
failure to construct a more civic-based definition of the nation
speaks to the people’s unwillingness to detach themselves
from their cultural and ethnic heritage—the lasting outrage
against Merkel and Altmaier’s handling of the refugee crisis
is evidence of this intractability.
To the dismay of those hoping for a civically-defined
national community, traditional collective identity in
Germany has proven remarkably resilient after decades
of state-led efforts at nurturing a more civic-oriented
society; the perceived importance of one’s cultural history
and ancestral origins will remain at the heart of the
German nation, much to the detriment of Germany’s
ethnic minority populations. However, the real shift in
perception should not be neglected. Germans do not
take as kindly to the AfD as 1930s Germans did with the
NSDAP and often object to the party’s rhetoric. Equally
importantly, many of the socioeconomic issues that have
fermented nationalist sentiment are resolvable by the
state, and an increasing number of Germans intermarry
with those of differing ethnicities. Thus, there is still
yet hope for a postnational constellation, even if recent
history suggests otherwise.
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Christmas Criminals
A Routine Activity Approach to Crime on U.S.
Holidays

Wyatt Lam

Based on Cohen and Felson’s 1979 routine activity theory, this study examines crime rates on prominent U.S.
holidays. Little research exists that analyzes crime patterns on holidays, despite the mass disruption of routine
activities. Using data from the National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS), this study compares the
average daily number of offenses per state on 15 holidays with the average daily number of offenses per state on
non-holiday weekdays for the 2016 calendar year. The crimes under investigation are economically motivated
crimes: burglary, larceny, motor vehicle theft, and robbery. Holidays are divided into groups for analysis based
on where activities are generally pursued by the public on each day: private space, public space, and mixed space.
The results reveal a distinct pattern in crime rates on holidays: economically motivated crimes tend to occur
less frequently on holidays, regardless of space classification. Despite an increased potential for contact between
suitable targets and motivated offenders on mixed and public space holidays, an increase in guardianship may be
a primary cause of lower economic crime rates on holidays. It is also possible that the increase in residence-based
activities on private and mixed space holidays reduces the number of suitable targets.
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Despite limited budgets, law enforcement officials are
expected to prevent crime, apprehend criminals, maintain
public order and safety, investigate criminal activity, and
provide services, such as education to the public. One way
that police have been able to more effectively utilize their
resources is by carrying out predictive policing. Predictive
policing is the practice of analyzing crime data to predict
and prevent future crimes (Perry et al. 2013). Crime
analysts use crime reporting databases such as the National
Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) and the National
Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS) to illustrate
crime tendencies. Often, local police departments utilize
these resources to generate crime patterns for their region,
including spatial hotspots mapping and temporal trends:
hourly, weekly, monthly, seasonal, and annual crime rates.
One promising perspective from criminological theory is
routine activity theory. Initially developed by Cohen and
Felson (1979), the theory has received broad support in
the field of criminology and may be helpful in improving
predictive policing. The theory states that crime occurs
when three key elements converge spatially and temporally:
a motivated offender, a suitable target, and the absence of
capable guardians. Cohen and Felson (1979) argue that
deviations from routine activities change the probability of
the three elements co-occurring.
Holidays, given their potential widespread disruption of
daily activities, are a promising cultural arena in which to
study Cohen and Felson’s theory (1979). For example,
holidays may cause many workplaces to close for the day,
which affects the daily activities of both their employees and
customers/clients. Holidays are especially important because
they represent a macro-causal factor for routine activity
changes. However, routine activity theory research has
tended to focus on small-scale interactions and has left out
population-scale ones. While there has been some research
on holiday crime patterns, the findings are scarce and
need further development. To improve predictive policing
practices, a thorough understanding of how holidays affect
crime rates is necessary.

Literature Review

Routine Activity Theory
Cohen and Felson (1979) developed routine activity theory as
an approach to crime analysis focused on the circumstances
of an offense as opposed to offender characteristics. The
theory focuses primarily on explaining victimization and
treats criminals as rational actors who weigh the potential
risks and benefits of committing crimes. According to
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routine activity theory, crime occurs when three key elements
converge spatially and temporally: a motivated offender, a
suitable target, and the absence of capable guardians (Cohen
and Felson 1979). Motivated offenders include anyone who
is capable and willing to commit crime. Suitable targets
include people and objects, such as cars, homes, stores,
etc. Capable guardians include formal guardians, such as
police or security personnel, and informal guardians, such
as bystanders, friends, bartenders, etc. Cohen and Felson
(1979) argued that the structure of daily activities influences
opportunities for victimization. Additionally, they suggested
that deviations from routine activities change the likelihood
of a motivated offender, a suitable target, and the absence of
capable guardians coming together in time and space.
Lynch (1987) provided early evidence in support of the
theory finding that victims’ workplace activities affect their
risk of workplace victimization to a much greater extent than
sociodemographic factors. Lynch (1987) found that activities
such as handling money and coming into contact with
numerous others on a given workday increase the likelihood
of workplace victimization. Groff (2007) performed a
rigorous multi-model test of routine activity theory in her
study of street robbery. She found that increased time spent
away from home increased the probability of victimization,
providing strong support for the theory.
Since its inception, routine activity theory has been used
to test a myriad of criminological phenomena including
victimization of teachers (O and Wilcox 2017), stalking
(Mustaine and Tewksbury 1999; Reyns et al. 2016; Wood
and Stichman 2018), sexual assault (Franklin et al. 2012;
Franklin and Menaker 2018), and motor vehicle theft
(Badiora 2017) to name a few. This body of research,
which examines violent and property crime alike, provides
mounting evidence that the types of activities pursued
on a regular basis influence individuals’ likelihood of
victimization. In recent years, research has also found that
individuals’ activities can predict the likelihood of cybercrime victimization, including consumer fraud (Pratt,
Holtfreter, and Reisig 2010), cyberbullying (Navarro and
Jasisnki 2011), and identity theft (Williams 2016; Reyns and
Henson 2016).

Holiday Crime Literature
Studies utilizing routine activity theory tend to focus
on identifying activities that increase the likelihood of
victimization. This study applies a macro-level analysis to
the disruption of daily patterned behavior. To identify the
general disruption of routine activities, this study examines
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events that tend to affect activities on a widespread basis:
holidays. Few studies have examined the effect of holidays
on crime patterns; however, holidays can have a dramatic
impact on daily activities. The mass interruption of activities
on holidays such as Christmas Day or New Year’s Eve
presents an important opportunity to examine how crime
rates are affected by the disruption of routine activities.
Early research by Lester (1979) examined homicides in the
United States in 1973 and found that their incidence tended
to increase on major holidays and weekends, coinciding with
increased contact with family, friends, and acquaintances.
More recently, de Melo, Pereira, Andresen, and Matias (2018)
studied the occurrence of homicide, rape, robbery, burglary,
and theft on prominent holidays in Campinas, Brazil,
between 2010 and 2013. They found homicides significantly
increased during the day, burglaries significantly increased
at night, and all other crimes significantly decreased during
these holidays. The researchers explained these results in
terms of guardianship; people tend to gather in groups on
holidays, deterring crime, but empty houses are typically
easily detected on holiday nights, leading to an increase in
burglaries. They also suggested that alcohol consumption
may contribute to the increase in these crimes.
Cohn and Rotton (2003) examined crime on holidays
during the years 1985 and 1988 in Minneapolis, Minnesota.
They analyzed differences in the following offenses between
major (federal) and minor holidays: assault, disorderly
conduct, domestic violence, burglary, theft, and robbery.
They found that thefts, burglaries, and robberies tended
to occur less frequently on major holidays while cases of
assault, disorderly conduct, and domestic violence tended
to increase on major holidays. In addition, minor holidays
had no significant effects on crime frequency. The results
of Cohn and Rotton’s study (2003) suggest that minor
holidays may not dramatically influence routine activities.
In addition, the decrease in economically motivated crimes
is consistent with the findings of de Melo et al. (2018) and
may reflect heightened guardianship on holidays.

Hypothesis, Data, and Methods
Offense and Holiday Choices

This study examines economically motivated crimes, which
are the crimes most often committed as rational decisions,
rather than impulsive actions. Specifically, this includes
burglary, larceny, motor vehicle theft, and robbery. Each
of these crimes involves the intentional theft of another’s
property. This study utilizes the official Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) definitions for these crimes (Federal

Bureau of Investigation 2010). Burglary is “the unlawful
entry of a structure to commit a felony or a theft.” Larceny
is “the unlawful taking, carrying, leading, or riding away of
property from the possession or constructive possession of
another.” Motor vehicle theft is “the theft or attempted theft
of a motor vehicle.” Robbery is “the taking or attempting
to take anything of value from the care, custody, or control
of a person or persons by force or threat of force or violence
and/or by putting the victim in fear.” By examining only
economically motivated crimes, this study aims to capture
the crimes for which routine activity theory is most
applicable.
Fifteen holidays that elicit widespread business closings
for the day and/or widespread celebration were chosen for
analysis. These holidays are New Year’s Day, Super Bowl
Sunday, Martin Luther King Jr. Day, President’s Day, St.
Patrick’s Day, Easter Sunday, Memorial Day, Independence
Day, Labor Day, Veteran’s Day, Thanksgiving, Black
Friday, Christmas Eve, Christmas Day, and New Year’s
Eve. Although they are not recognized as holidays by the
federal government, Black Friday and Super Bowl Sunday
are celebrated as unofficial holidays in popular culture.

Holiday Operationalization
Unlike Cohn and Rotton (2003), who organized their
analysis of holidays around whether the days were major
or minor holidays, this study organizes holidays based on
where activities are generally pursued by the public on each
day. I organize holidays into three categories: private space,
public space, and mixed space. I chose to categorize holidays
by space typically occupied because where people gather
directly influences the number of motivated offenders,
suitable targets, and guardians. Each category reflects space
occupation tendencies as compared to the typical workday.
The private space category consists of holidays on which people
tend to stay inside their homes more often than a typical
workday. The holidays in the private space category include
Martin Luther King Jr. Day, President’s Day, Memorial Day,
Labor Day, Veteran’s Day, and Christmas Day. For most of
the holidays in this category, work schedules are interrupted
but few are celebrating. There may be variation in activities
on Memorial Day, on which many people stay indoors as
compared to a typical workday, but others may participate
in outdoor activities such as going to parks, having picnics,
going to lunch, etc. Christmas Day differs from other
holidays in the private space category because most people
do celebrate throughout the day; however, they tend to do so
from the comfort of their own homes or the homes of family.
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The public space category consists of holidays on which
people typically celebrate in places outside of where their
routine activities typically take them. This includes bars,
clubs, restaurants, and parties. Holidays in the public space
category include St. Patrick’s Day, Independence Day, and
New Year’s Eve. Independence Day and New Year’s Eve are
federal holidays, so schools, businesses, and organizations
are closed, but people still tend to spend large parts of these
days in public spaces. Because Independence Day is in the
summer, many people spend all day outside, especially at
parks, barbecues and parties. On the night of New Year’s
Eve, many people attend celebrations, which I predict draw
a substantial portion of Americans into public spaces for
considerable lengths of time. Because St. Patrick’s Day fell
on a weekday in 2016, I infer that activities on this day
followed routines until the late afternoon when many chose
to celebrate, often at bars.
The mixed space category consists of days in which many
people may be out in public spaces for large parts of the day,
but others may spend the majority of the day at home or the
home of family. These are days on which most people do not
have typical responsibilities like work or school. The holidays
in the mixed space category are New Year’s Day, Super Bowl
Sunday, Easter Sunday, Thanksgiving, Black Friday, and
Christmas Eve. On New Year’s Day, some people choose
to celebrate away from home, some are recovering from the
previous night’s celebration, and some spend the day at home
getting ready for work or school to resume. On Super Bowl
Sunday, many people stay home to watch the game, while
others watch the game at bars and celebrate afterwards.
Easter Sunday traditions may include spending time at
home with family, attending church, and participating in
Easter-related activities such as egg hunts in outdoor spaces.
Similarly, Thanksgiving is often a day spent at home with
family or traveling. Many people spend Thanksgiving night
shopping, as many stores offer special deals at or before
midnight. Black Friday is a day of shopping for many people,
but the rise in popularity of online retailers has the potential
to keep many shoppers at home. On Christmas Eve, people
celebrate at parties, and many go to church, but it is also
common for people to spend large portions of the day at
home, typically with family.

Hypothesis
I analyze separate hypotheses for burglary, larceny, motor
vehicle theft, and robbery to ascertain whether there is
consistency in holiday crime rates across economically
motivated crimes. Based on the three holiday categories, and
the premise that changes in routine activities have an effect
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on how much crime tends to occur, I predict the following
for economically motivated crimes on holidays:
H1: Compared to the daily average, the number of reported
burglaries will be lower on private space holidays and higher
on public space holidays.
On private space days, I presume that the number of suitable
targets for burglaries (empty homes) decreases, while the
amount of guardianship increases because most people are
gathered at home on these days. I predict that fewer suitable
targets and increased guardianship results in fewer burglaries
on private space holidays.
On public space days, I presume that the number of suitable
targets increases and the amount of guardianship decreases
because more people gather in public on these days than
the average day. I presume that a rational offender would
anticipate people leaving homes unattended, increasing the
number of motivated offenders. I predict that the increase
in suitable targets, decrease in guardianship, and increase
in motivated offenders results in more burglaries on public
space holidays.
H2: Compared to the daily average, the number of reported
larcenies will be lower on private space holidays and higher
on public space holidays.
H3: Compared to the daily average, the number of reported
motor vehicle thefts will be lower on private space holidays
and higher on public space holidays.
H4: Compared to the daily average, the number of reported
robberies will be lower on private space holidays and higher
on public space holidays.
On private space days, I presume that the number of suitable
targets for larcenies, motor vehicle thefts, and robberies
decreases because all three crimes rely on contact between
motivated offenders and targets. I presume that this contact
occurs less frequently on private space holidays because many
people tend to stay inside residences for most of the day. I
presume that the amount of guardianship increases because,
compared to the daily average, more people are clustered
together at home on these days. I predict that fewer suitable
targets and increased guardianship results in fewer larcenies,
motor vehicle thefts, and robberies on private space holidays.
On public space days, I presume that the number of suitable
targets increases because many people are congregating in
public places where motivated offenders are likely to be found.
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This increases the potential for contact between motivated
offenders and suitable targets. I presume that an increased
consumption of alcohol creates more suitable targets, more
motivated offenders, and less-capable guardians. Intoxication
lowers awareness, which may make individuals more suitable
targets and less-capable guardians, especially if rational
offenders anticipate such an opportunity. Additionally,
intoxication lowers inhibitions and reduces judgment, which
may increase the number of motivated offenders willing to
commit economically motivated crimes. I predict that the
increase in suitable targets, increase in motivated offenders,
and decrease in capable guardians results in more larcenies,
motor vehicle thefts, and robberies on public space holidays.
H5: Compared to the daily average, the number of reported
burglaries, larcenies, motor vehicle thefts, and robberies will
not be notably different on mixed space holidays.
On mixed space holidays, I presume that opportunities for
crime both increase and decrease to a similar degree as a
result of public and private space activities, respectively. As
such, I predict no appreciable change in reported offenses.

National Incident-Based Reporting
System (NIBRS)
NIBRS is an incident-based crime reporting system, which
houses data on all instances of crime that law enforcement
report across the United States. Included in this data set is
criminal and victim information, such as demographics, and
crime information, such as when, where, and how the crime
occurred. 57 different crimes are captured by NIBRS and
broken down into three categories: crimes against persons (of
which individuals are victims), crimes against property (of
which money or property is the object), and crimes against
society (which are actions prohibited by society, such as drug
use). Each of the 57 offenses are classified in the NIBRS
database according to the official FBI definitions (Federal
Bureau of Investigation 2010).
NIBRS is a part of the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR)
program administered by the FBI. City, county, and state
officials from 48 states voluntarily collect and report incidentbased crime logs on a monthly basis to state or federal UCR
programs. Given that the organization of reports from
different agencies and states may differ, UCR programs must
merge, restructure, and subset the data into yearly, formally
structured NIBRS data sets. The data are made public on
the National Archive of Criminal Justice Data (NACJD)
website, which is a part of the Inter-University Consortium
for Political and Social Research at the University of Michigan.

Procedure and Data Analysis

2016 NIBRS data were downloaded from the NACJD
website into SPSS Statistics software. All incidents of
crime outside of burglary, larceny, motor vehicle theft, and
robbery were removed from the data set. Burglary includes
breaking and entering. Larceny includes pocket-picking,
purse-snatching, shoplifting, theft from a building, theft
from a coin-operated machine or device, theft from a motor
vehicle, theft of motor vehicle parts/accessories, and all other
larceny. New variables were created to indicate holidays and
holiday space groupings. While working with multiple years
of data would be ideal, the computer files for any single year
are massive and tax the computing power available to the
average person. Thus, 2016 data were aggregated by state and
incident date with simple counts of offenses. Weekends were
omitted from the data set in order to best compare holiday
crime rates with crime rates of the typical Monday through
Friday “work-week.” Means comparisons were produced to
compare the state daily average number of crimes on holidays
versus non-holiday weekdays. The comparisons were run on
the total of all four economically motivated crimes, and then
broken out for each specific crime category. There are five
sets of analyses for examining individual holidays and five
sets for examining holiday categories.

Statistical Significance
Statistical significance is not particularly relevant in this
study because the NIBRS data set was not acquired through
a probability sample. The data can be best described as a
convenience sample, given that many police departments
choose not to report or are unable to report crime incidents
to the UCR. As a result, the data set contains only crimes
that are available to the FBI. Additionally, the data are not
a sample of available crimes but rather the entirety of those
crimes. Therefore, significance has been excluded from the
results.

First of the Month
There is an overrepresentation of crime on the first of each
month in the NIBRS data set, meaning there are substantially
more economically motivated crimes recorded on the first of
the month than any other day. Unfortunately, the cause of
this is unknown, and I highly suspect it to be a recording
artifact as opposed to a real criminological phenomenon.
However, because I do not know the cause for certain, I have
chosen to keep these days in the data set. Overall, the daily
averages are not noticeably affected, but New Years Day has
an unusually high number of reported offenses.
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Results

Burglary

All Four Economically Motivated Crimes

Figure 1 illustrates the results of comparing the state daily
average number of economically motivated crimes in each
holiday category with the state daily average number of
economically motivated crimes on non-holiday weekdays.
On holidays in all three categories, fewer economically
motivated crimes occurred on average per state than the
2016 daily weekday average of 181.39. This finding is
inconsistent with H5, in which I predicted that the number
of reported burglaries, larcenies, motor vehicle thefts, and
robberies would not be notably different on mixed space
holidays compared to the daily average.
Figure 1: State Daily Average Economically Motivated Crimes
in 2016 by Holiday Category
Mixed Space Holidays

Figure 3 illustrates the results of comparing the state daily
average number of burglaries in each holiday category with
the state daily average number of burglaries on weekday nonholidays. On holidays in all three categories, fewer burglaries
occurred on average per state than the 2016 daily weekday
average of 36.18. This finding is inconsistent with H1, in
which I predicted that the number of reported burglaries
would be lower on private space holidays and higher on
public space holidays compared to the daily average.
Figure 3: State Daily Average Burglaries in 2016 by Holiday
Category
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Figure 2 illustrates the results of comparing the state daily
average number of economically motivated crimes on each
individual holiday with the state daily average number of
economically motivated crimes on non-holiday weekdays.
On 2 of 15 holidays, more economically motivated crimes
occurred on average per state than the 2016 daily weekday
average.
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Figure 4: State Daily Average Burglaries in 2016 by Individual
Holiday
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Figure 4 illustrates the results of comparing the state daily
average number of burglaries on each individual holiday with
the state daily average number of burglaries on non-holiday
weekdays. On 3 of 15 holidays, more burglaries occurred on
average per state than the 2016 daily weekday average.

Martin Luther King Jr. Day

Figure 2: State Daily Average Number of Economically
Motivated Crimes in 2016 by Individual Holiday
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Figure 5 illustrates the results of comparing the state daily
average number of larcenies in each holiday category with
the state daily average number of larcenies on weekday nonholidays. On holidays in all three categories, fewer larcenies
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occurred on average per state than the 2016 daily weekday
average of 128.96. This finding is inconsistent with H2, in
which I predicted that the number of reported larcenies
would be lower on private space holidays and higher on
public space holidays compared to the daily average.
Figure 5: State Daily Average Larcenies in 2016 by Holiday
Category

I predicted that the number of reported motor vehicle
thefts would be lower on private space holidays and higher
on public space holidays compared to the daily average.
Figure 7: State Daily Average Motor Vehicle Thefts in 2016 by
Holiday Category
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Figure 6: State Daily Average Larcenies in 2016 by Individual
Holiday
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Figure 8 illustrates the results of comparing the state daily
average number of motor vehicle thefts on each individual
holiday with the state daily average number of motor vehicle
thefts on non-holiday weekdays. On 6 of 15 holidays, more
motor vehicle thefts occurred on average per state than the
2016 daily weekday average.
Figure 8: State Daily Average Motor Vehicle Thefts in 2016 by
Individual Holiday
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Figure 6 illustrates the results of comparing the state daily
average number of larcenies on each individual holiday with
the state daily average number of larcenies on non-holiday
weekdays. On 2 of 15 holidays, more larcenies occurred on
average per state than the 2016 daily weekday average.
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Motor Vehicle Theft
Figure 7 illustrates the results of comparing the state daily
average number of motor vehicle thefts in each holiday
category with the state daily average number of motor
vehicle thefts on non-holiday weekdays. On holidays in
all three categories, fewer motor vehicle thefts occurred
on average per state than the 2016 daily weekday average
of 17.22. This finding is inconsistent with H3, in which

Figure 9 illustrates the results of comparing the state daily
average number of robberies in each holiday category with
the state daily average number of robberies on non-holiday
weekdays. On private space holidays and mixed space
holidays, fewer robberies occurred on average per state than
the 2016 daily weekday average of 7.29. On public space
holidays, more robberies occurred on average per state than
the 2016 daily weekday average. This finding is consistent
with H4, in which I predicted that the number of reported
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robberies would be lower on private space holidays and higher
on public space holidays compared to the daily average.
Figure 9: State Daily Average Robberies in 2016 by Holiday
Category
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Figure 10 illustrates the results of comparing the state daily
average number of robberies on each individual holiday with
the state daily average number of robberies on non-holiday
weekdays. On 6 of 15 holidays, more robberies occurred on
average per state than the 2016 daily weekday average.
Figure 10: State Daily Average Robberies in 2016 by Individual
Holiday
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Discussion and Conclusion

This study analyzes crime rates for burglary, larceny, motor
vehicle theft, and robbery on prominent U.S. holidays in
2016 from the perspective of routine activity theory. The
results reveal a distinct pattern in crime rates on holidays:
economically motivated crimes tend to occur less frequently
on holidays, regardless of space classification.
For holiday groups, the results consistently indicate (14 out
of 15 times across all five sets of holiday group analyses) that
economically motivated crimes tend to occur less frequently
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The consistently lower rates in economically motivated
crimes on holidays found in this study mirrors the findings
of de Melo et al. (2018) and Cohn and Rotton (2003).
Besides an increase in evening burglaries, de Melo et al.
(2018) found that fewer economic crimes occurred on
holidays. Likewise, Cohn and Rotton (2003) found that
fewer economic crimes occurred on major holidays. In my
hypotheses, I predicted that this study’s results for private
space holidays would match these two previous studies, but
I did not predict that crime rates on public space holidays or
mixed space holidays would also be lower than the weekday
average. My hypotheses were based primarily upon the
motivated offender and suitable target elements of routine
activity theory. On public space days, I presumed that the
paths of motivated offenders and suitable targets would
cross more frequently due to widespread celebration in and
movement through public spaces, leading to higher crime
rates. However, this study’s results suggest other factors
may be associated with the unanticipated lower crime rates
observed. One explanation is that potential offenders are
preoccupied with holiday activities and celebration such
that there are fewer motivated offenders to take advantage of
suitable targets. Another explanation is proposed by de Melo
et al. (2018) and Cohn and Rotton (2003): guardianship
plays a substantial role in deterring crime on holidays.

7

Christmas Eve

Non-Holiday Weekday

on holidays regardless of category. For individual holidays,
the pattern is the same: the results consistently indicate
(56 out of 75 times across all five sets of individual holiday
analyses) that economically motivated crimes tend to occur
less frequently on holidays. While robbery and motor vehicle
theft show the least consistency, each of the holidays with
crime rates higher than the weekday average show only
minor elevations over the average.

I presume that on holidays in all three categories, people
tend to gather together. On private space holidays, people
are off work and children are out of school, so many people
tend to gather in private residences for the day. Not only is
there little contact with motivated offenders, there is also
family nearby. On public space holidays, people tend to stay
in groups. People are celebrating together either with family,
friends, or large groups of strangers (e.g., at bars, clubs, or
parties). While imbibing alcohol may impact guardianship
capabilities on these days, guardians may not need to be
entirely capable of “guarding” to be effective deterrents.
Simply being with other people may deter potential criminals,
regardless of the guardians’ sobriety. Additionally, police
patrol known public events, so truly “capable” guardianship
is typically present as well. On mixed space holidays, people

2019-2020 / Volume 7
pursue both private and public holiday activities and are
subject to the same guardianship tendencies.

Study Drawbacks
There are four primary drawbacks to this research that should
be discussed. First, only 48 states contribute their crime
data to NIBRS, and many states have only a few precincts
reporting. Therefore, the data do not completely represent all
areas of the country, nor the true average number of crimes
committed per state. Next, in any given year, a locality, city,
or the country as a whole may focus resources on particular
types of crime. Policies at each of these administrative levels
influence police activity and resource allocation. Therefore,
official crime statistics like NIBRS may be a better indicator
of police behavior than actual levels of crime. Third,
seasonal temperatures may influence the kinds of activities
individuals pursue when their routine activities are disrupted.
For example, the activities in which people participate on
Christmas are different than those on Independence Day. It
is likely that different sets of non-routine activities result in
different likelihoods of crime occurring. Lastly, this study
is only based on one year’s worth of data. Adding more
years would increase the validity and generalizability of this
study’s findings.

of guardianship on holidays and how criminals navigate
and are deterred by its presence. I would also recommend
that weekend routines and crime rates be analyzed and
compared to those of holidays. Both weekends and holidays
are a departure from weekday “business-as-usual” routines,
so one might suppose that weekend crime rates are similar
to holiday crime rates. Finally, the rates of other crimes, such
as homicide or rape, could be examined on holidays. The
results of such an analysis could be vastly different than the
one presented here, given that acquaintances are more likely
offenders than strangers for those crimes.

Study Implications and Future Research
This study was a worthwhile examination of routine activity
theory because it shows that the theory can be applied broadly
to generalizable sets of activities to better understand where
police resources are best applied. The analysis presented here
suggests that maintaining police presence on holidays with
large gatherings of people in public spaces is an important
deterrent of crime. However, police should be wary not to
over-distribute resources on holidays given that friends,
family, and nearby others are effective deterrents as well.
I have theorized that, despite an increased potential for
contact between suitable targets and motivated offenders on
mixed and public space holidays, the increase in guardianship
may be a primary cause of lower economic crime rates on
holidays. It is also likely that the increase in private space
activities on private and mixed space holidays also reduces
the number of suitable targets. However, the consistency of
lower crime rates across all holiday groups makes certainty
about the underlying factors impossible. Future research
should aim to identify with more confidence the causes
for reduced economic crime rates on holidays. This study
could be replicated with more years of NIBRS data so that
breaking incidents down by state is no longer necessary.
Additionally, I suggest that future studies examine the nature
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An Analysis of Technological Components
in Relation to Privacy in a Smart City

Kayla Rutherford, Ben Lands,
and A. J. Stiles

A smart city is an interconnection of technological components that store, process, and wirelessly transmit
information to enhance the efficiency of applications and the individuals who use those applications. Over the
course of the 21st century, it is expected that an overwhelming majority of the world’s population will live in urban
areas and that the number of wireless devices will increase. The resulting increase in wireless data transmission
means that the privacy of data will be increasingly at risk. This paper uses a holistic problem-solving approach
to evaluate the security challenges posed by the technological components that make up a smart city, specifically
radio frequency identification, wireless sensor networks, and Bluetooth. The holistic focus in turn permits a set of
technical and ethical approaches that can combat malicious attacks and enhance data security across the networks
that drive smart cities.
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1. Introduction

As cities become increasingly connected through smart
technologies and as current big data collection practices
continue to go unchecked, information privacy has the
potential to diminish. If procedures on data handling and
security are not standardized early in the implementation of
cyber-physical systems and Internet of Things (IoT) systems,
then privacy gaps and invasive data mining will likely arise.
These threats have the potential to affect the advancement
of smart cities, as citizens may feel their privacy rights are
unduly compromised, which in turn may undermine public
support. In order to protect the right to privacy from invasive
attacks on vulnerable networks and devices in emerging
smart cities, solutions that address both social and technical
aspects of the issue must be devised and analyzed.
Smart cities are a collection of interconnected technologies
that can communicate with one another to monitor, collect,
interpret, and distribute data. These entwined devices
make up the IoT, a global network of wirelessly-connected
devices. A smart city is constructed of a network-based
foundation that contains appliances and infrastructures that
in turn contain sensors, software, and electrical components.
The broader purposes of smart cities vary from customer
convenience to power reduction. The technological foundation of smart cities rests on three primary elements: radio
frequency identification (RFID) for identification and
tracking, wireless sensor networks (WSN) which are standalone networks for measuring data, and Bluetooth for
connecting separate devices.
To understand and develop a solution to a problem, one
must understand the complexity of its dimensions. This
is done through holistic problem solving, an approach for
examining elements, relationships, and the system dynamics
of a complex problem. According to the Penn State College
of Agricultural Sciences (n.d.), a complex problem, also
known as a “wicked” problem, cannot be solved by a
single solution. The problem with privacy in a smart city is
complicated because of the value placed on privacy, as well as
the technological underpinnings within such cities. Multiple
stakeholders with different levels of interest, connection, and
power shape the problem. Data security may be presented
in many alternative methods, so a single solution will be
insufficient to address the various interests of stakeholders.
The first step of a holistic approach, and the focus of this
paper, is to determine the problem through framing. Framing
is describing and interpreting the problem by choosing which
aspects to prioritize and which to leave in the background.
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Framing lessens the complexity of the problem by narrowing
the scope to a specific area of interest, and thus allows for a
more scientific problem statement (Bartee, 1973). Potential
solutions must then be analyzed holistically to determine
their effectiveness and to understand how they will impact
the various stakeholders.
The larger problem is how to ensure users’ rights to privacy
in a growing technological world. Using a holistic problemsolving approach, this paper identifies technical solutions
that employ existing and emerging RFID, WSN, and
Bluetooth technologies, along with policy solutions that
begin to address the social and ethical issues involved in
building smart cities.

2. Framing the Issue

2.1 Smart Cities and Privacy
Smart cities are designed to improve the lives of citizens
by creating an environment that continuously adapts and
monitors data collection (Cui et al., 2018; Eckhoff & Wagner,
2018; Sookhak et al., 2019). Amsterdam implemented its
smart city plan with the intent of reducing CO2 emissions
among infrastructure and people through smart building
management systems, ship-to-grid power connections, and
climate streets that feature LED lights, waste reduction
systems, and smart meters (Šťáhlavský, 2011; Alaverdyan,
2018). Vienna proudly advertises its commitment as a smart
city to “digital data (mined using state-of-the-art technologies
and analytical methods) to support decision-making and for
real-time management of urban systems” (Stadt Wien, n.d.).
China alone has more than 200 smart city plans in progress
(Cui et al., 2018).
In these cities, multiple data sources from different data
holders, devices, and applications can be combined to
achieve city efficiency. However, doing so increases the risk
of information being intercepted, which can have severe
consequences (Eckhoff & Wagner, 2018). Applications
which can collect highly sensitive data like citizen location
or private documents may be used by system hackers
(Sookhak et al., 2019). For instance, the Dyn company
was hit with denial-of-service attacks in 2016 that saturated
its infrastructure and disrupted host services (Khatoun &
Zeadally, 2017). Additionally, a 2015 study demonstrated
that a 2014 Jeep Cherokee could be hacked and controlled
wirelessly by exploiting the vehicle’s Uconnect system (Miller
& Valasek, 2015). This shows that the harm of infringing on
someone’s privacy—for example, by locating an individual
within a particular vehicle—can be immediate and physical.
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2.2 Privacy and Security

Privacy is jeopardized by malicious attacks. There are two
primary types of attacks: physical and system. Physical attacks take advantage of a device in a physical manner and
are not associated with network intervention. Examples of
physical attacks include disabling devices, modifying devices,
and cloning tags (Khattab et al., 2017). System attacks use
malicious software to acquire information (Attacks, 2015).
There are several common types of system attacks:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Spoofing - impersonating another individual or 		
computer system
Insertion - sending new messages from a host
Replay - repeating or delaying data
Relay - intercepting/manipulating messages
between two parties
Denial-of-Service (DoS) - disrupting services of a
network-connected host
Skimming - capturing information from a cardholder

3. Smart City Technologies
3.1 RFIDs, WSNs, and Bluetooth

While privacy issues are raised by data collection practices
used by smart cities and the companies they support,
problems may also occur through potential security breaches.
Smart cities track the identity and movement of objects
through RFID tags, which combine a microchip and an
antenna to store, process, and then relay or actively send data
(Dominikus & Kraxberger, 2011; Juels et al., 2003). Data
in RFID tags is processed and sent through a vulnerable
wireless network that connects each tag to its reader (Singh,
2013). The reader sends an electromagnetic wave that drives
the internal circuit of the tag to send data to the user if the
signal is strong enough (Singh, 2013).
Tracking and identifying objects within a smart city is
necessary to provide inventory accuracy, advanced security,
and efficiency for everyday usage. For instance, RFID tags
are used for monitoring and analyzing locations, such as a
greenhouse environment, or information stored on health
devices (Subramanian et al., 2005). RFID tags can also be
used to gain access to a compound or facility because the
reader is able to locate the corresponding tag to gain access.
The tags function in the same manner in cases that require
bus entry, card access, or personnel tracking. RFID tags are
also capable of detecting small concentrations of explosives
and other dangerous chemicals (Subramanian et al., 2005).
Smart cities may also rely on WSNs, spatially diverse collections of sensors that monitor and gather data through con-

necting networks to support a range of operations (Conti,
2016). These operations include surveillance, rescue support,
fire prevention, and air pollution monitoring (Conti, 2016).
WSNs have a vast range of sensor nodes and data storage
receivers that can monitor physical and environmental conditions.
Additionally, smart cities may use Bluetooth technology
to transfer data between devices. Bluetooth is based on a
primary/replica relationship between devices. This means
that one device has unidirectional control over the other.
Using this relationship, Bluetooth can create ad hoc shortrange networks whose wireless traffic can be observed by
malicious users within a densely populated area. Securing this
wireless communication can increase the privacy individuals
have when communicating on these channels.

3.2 Privacy Implications
RFID tags are inexpensive, and connecting them to the IoT
is relatively easy; however, security protocols and frameworks
must be analyzed to secure the data transmission within a
network. Due to the use of these tags in a connected city,
data must be secured properly to prevent hacking. RFID
tags store information as well as track and monitor objects
or people. This can result in a violation of one’s privacy if
this information is obtained. However, due to the constraints
of RFID tags, such as limitations in memory size, energy,
and response time, only specific security protocols can be
implemented (Dominikus & Kraxberger, 2011). RFID tag
memory can be increased, but it would be costly. Currently,
RFID tags can hold an average of 64 kB of data depending on
the type of tag (Dominikus & Kraxberger, 2011). According
to Dominkus and Kraxberger (2011), these limitations of
memory “could be a problem for the proposed security layer
protocols” (p. 2647).
Security protocols can be different for the different types of
RFID tags available: active, semi-active, and passive. Active
and semi-active tags are powered by a battery; however, active tags automatically send information while semi-active
remain dormant until receiving a reader signal (Dominikus
& Kraxberger, 2011). In contrast, passive tags do not have
a power source and require energy from the reader to send
information (Dominikus & Kraxberger, 2011). Each of these
tags has different byte sizes and ranges to account for when
looking at its security framework (Singh, 2013). Because
passive tags hold less memory and are cheaper to produce,
they are more susceptible to attacks compared to active and
semi-active tags (Singh, 2013).
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WSNs provide high accessibility to data flows, but the “open”
nature of the channel makes them prone to hacking (Khan
& Mauri, 2014). WSNs are multivariate, meaning they are
immune to computer attacks, which increases their security.
However, adding mobility to any technology increases its
vulnerability to security threats. Data is sent over the network
with a larger range, increasing the time it takes for data to be
received.
With any technical device, there are constraints on its
security implementation. That is to say, all security devices
have resource requirements. For WSNs, there are limitations
such as memory and power. The memory of a WSN can
only hold 178 bytes for code storage in a TelosB with a 10K
RAM, 48K program memory, and 1024K flash storage, thus
providing limited storage for implementing security protocols
(Conti, 2016). Additionally, encryption, decryption, and
the transmission and storage of security data all consume
power. This energy consumption limits the life span of the
node (Khan & Mauri, 2014). Multi-hop routing, network
congestion, and node processing can lead to greater latency
in the network (Conti, 2016). High latency makes it difficult
to achieve synchronization among sensor nodes.
Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) can be a cost-, time- and
energy-efficient way of securely pairing mobile devices within
a smart city where they are able to join or leave a network
dynamically (Garcia, 2018). The security of each device is
essential to the security of the entire network. If the devices
of a network are not endowed with the same level of security,
this creates a backdoor which can allow malicious activity to
enter the network. Malicious attacks can cause technologies
to be susceptible to detailed scans exposing informational
parameters, service profiles, or even personal data (Haase &
Handy, 2004).

4. RFID Technical Solutions

If smart cities rely on RFID technologies, as is expected,
security measures must be analyzed to ensure that data being
sent over a wireless network is secure. Sensitive data is often
found in devices that track information on an object, provide
access to facilities, and transmit across the network. Security
solutions have been devised at both the network and physical
levels.

4.1 RFID Authentication and Eavesdropping
At the network level, RFIDs need to be authenticated
properly to prevent hackers from eavesdropping on data
transmission.One suggestion has been to make “Smart
RFID” tags that generate their own random pseudo IDs so
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that a passive eavesdropper cannot encrypt the signal being
sent by the reader (Juels et al., 2003; Sobti & Geetha, 2012).
In this approach, A-TRAP protocols exchange three values
generated pseudo-randomly between the tag and server (Le
et al., 2007). The server checks to ensure that a designated
value is in the database before accepting the tag as authentic.
A-TRAP protocols offer “secure authentication, forwardanonymity, availability, and key-indistinguishability,” but
cannot withstand sustained attacks or instances when the
tag is lost (Le et al., 2007, p. 13). Later proposed protocols
generated four and five pseudo-random values to anonymize
the communication between the server and the tag and to
prevent replay attacks (Le et al., 2007). Despite the growing
sophistication of these key mechanisms, as Avoine et al.
(2011) pointed out a decade ago, they remain vulnerable to
compromise in open communities with more open networks.

4.2 RFID Denial-of-Service Attacks
Connecting tags to the IoT system in a smart city makes them
prone to attacks in an open network. One possibility is to use
IPv6 to defend RFID tags against DoS attacks (Dominikus
& Kraxberger, 2011). IPv6 is the most recent version of the
Internet Protocol, and it uses 128-bit addresses to identify
and locate devices on the network and route traffic across
the Internet (Dominikus & Kraxberger, 2011). According
to Dominikus and Kraxberger (2011), a reader could track
the communication with a mobile IPv6-enabled tag while
also blocking attacks from suspicious nodes. Timeout values,
which end one connection and accept new connection
attempts, can also be randomized to defend against hackers.

4.3 Physical Solutions to RFID Attacks

The ability to “kill” RFID tags when a good is purchased can
be useful because dead RFID tags cannot collect consumer
data (Juels et al., 2003). Similarly, the ability to put RFID
tags to sleep allows users to turn tags on and off when desired
(Sitlia et al., 2009). A more secure method of defending
against physical attacks is through blocker tags. Blocker
tags are RFID tags that can block readers from reading the
identification of tags that exist in the blocker tag’s range
(Juels et al., 2003; Sitlia et al., 2009).

5. WSN Technical Solutions

Wireless sensor networks continuously monitor an
environment to gather and organize sensitive information
regarding city infrastructure. If this data were intercepted or
if the technologies were hacked, one could obtain control
over a spatial environment. Solutions have been devised to
secure these technologies and their data.
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5.1 WSN Authentication and Confidentiality
Public-key cryptosystems are an effective method for
securing WSN authentication and confidentiality. Some of
the major techniques used in public-key cryptosystems are
the Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman scheme (RSA), Elliptic
Curve Cryptography (ECC), and Multivariate Quadratic
Quasigroups (MQQ) (Gligoroski et al., 2008). Each of
these techniques provides different efficiency, security, and
memory usage, shown in Table 1. The design of ECC is tough
to develop, but its complexity makes the system difficult to
crack (Quirino et al., 2012).
Table 1: Public-Key Cryptosystem Comparisons

Note. Adapted from “Asymmetric Encryption in Wireless Sensor
Networks” by G. Quirino, A. Ribeiro, and E. Moreno, 2012,
(https://doi.org/10.5772/48464).

5.2 ECCE Protocol
One experimental solution for WSN security concerns
proposed by Conti et al. (2007) is an Enhanced Cooperative
Channel Establishment (ECCE). The purpose of this
protocol is to allow a secure wireless channel between two
sensors that do not share any pre-deployed key (Conti et al.,
2007). According to Conti et al. (2007), “in comparison
with other protocols, ECCE performs effectively in “channel
existence and channel resilience” when faced with an attacker
(p. 61).

5.3 SPINS
A third solution is the use of SPINS, a secure communication
protocol proposed by Perrig et al. (2002) that prevents

eavesdropping and active attacks in wireless sensor networks.
There are “two secure building blocks” associated with the
SPINS protocol: SNEP and µTesla (Perrig et al., 2002, p.
521).
Secure Network Encryption Protocol (SNEP) uses a twoparty authentication protocol that provides confidentiality
between the two corresponding parties (Perrig et al., 2002).
A common protocol used for data authentication is the
Message Authentication Code (MAC), which sends a message
and a signature (Ullah et al., 2009). When the message has
been obtained, the receiver performs a computation on the
message and compares the generated message’s MAC value
to the sent MAC value to determine if the message is from
a legitimate user (Ullah et al., 2009). This process makes it
feasible to use the SNEP protocol for the network system.
SNEP “has low communication overhead” and “only adds 8
bytes per message” (Perrig et al., 2002, p. 524). Therefore, it
wouldn’t take up too many resources to use this protocol in a
wireless sensor network.
µTesla, an experimental, “‘micro’ version of the Timed
Efficient Streaming Loss-tolerant Authentication protocol
(TESLA), [provides] authenticated screening broadcast”
(Ullah et al., 2009, p. 333). µTesla uses asymmetry through
a delayed disclosure of symmetric keys, which results in
an effective broadcast authentication scheme (Ullah et al.,
2009). Asymmetric cryptographic mechanisms by themselves
are resource-intensive and require a significant amount of
computation (Perrig et al., 2002). By using µTesla, this issue
can be efficiently resolved.

6. Bluetooth Technical
Solutions

There are two key Bluetooth protocols: traditional Bluetooth
and Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE). Bluetooth resides within
the IEEE 802.15 protocol family dedicated for personal area
networks (i.e., the networks for connecting an individual
person’s devices). If Bluetooth is to be implemented within
smart cities on a wide scale, traditional Bluetooth will not
suffice. Traditional Bluetooth design requires one watt of
power consumption and operates at a data transmission rate
of 25 Mbps while BLE is ~2 Mbps (Bulíc et al., 2019). Unfortunately, a reduced capacity for security follows suit with
this reduced data transmission rate and lowered power consumption, similar to most wireless device communications.

During the pairing process, devices exchange their specific
security and functionality capabilities. If the device-relative
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capabilities are supported, the primary device will generate
a temporary key, which will be used to produce the shortterm key. The short-term key is then used to encrypt the data
transferred between devices.

Table 2: Potential Bluetooth Pairing Methods

By contrast, the bonding process does persist across connections between devices to bypass the pairing phase on subsequent connections. In order to bond two devices to each
other, they must engage in an initial pairing process. Bonding uses a long-term key stored on each device to encrypt the
communication channel between them.
The different levels of security for Bluetooth depend on
the capabilities of each device. If Bluetooth v4.2 or later is
used, then the connection can be further secured, though
not 100% secured. BLE v4.2 offers an enhanced security
process utilizing the Diffie-Hellman algorithm, which allows
two devices to generate a shared key on each side. Still,
the security of the locally stored keys is imperative to BLE
security (Kainda et al., 2009).
Unfortunately, Bluetooth devices authenticate devices rather
than the users of devices. To investigate and enhance user
authentication, a study was conducted in 2009 to test the
usability of different methods for pairing secure devices
(Kainda et al., 2009). Kainda et al. (2009) found that the
“Compare & Confirm” method shown in Table 2 is the
easiest for users to interface with as they pair unfamiliar
devices. In addition, no security failures arose during the
study using the “Compare & Confirm” method, suggesting
that it is promising for increasing security (Kainda et al.,
2009).
To help the general public realize that these low energy
devices result in low security, they should be informed of
their vulnerabilities. However, the public should also be made
aware of possible methods for securing Bluetooth devices.
When pairing Bluetooth devices, Out-of-Band (OOB)
channels should be implemented with personal identification
numbers as opposed to link keys. This approach should
prevent persistent man-in-the-middle attacks in an open
environment where attackers can snoop for keys sent between
devices. Additionally, these PINs should be set to a longer
value that includes both letters and numbers. However, this
technique would be restricted to devices which have displays.
An active attack increases the amount of power it consumes
as a result of the increased traffic it receives and potentially
distributes. Even if the attack is unsuccessful, the increased
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Note. Adapted from “Usability and Security of Out-of-Band Channels in Secure Device Pairing Protocols” by R. Kainda, I. Flechais, and
A. Roscoe, 2009, (https://doi.org/10.1145/1572532.1572547).

power consumption renders the targeted device offline,
thereby reducing the capabilities of the Bluetooth network.
Restricting a device’s power consumption rate will reduce the
propensity for this issue to occur.

7. Ethical Frameworks for Privacy
and Cybersecurity
The big questions concerning the ethics of big data not only
pertain to what information is being collected, but also “who
and what is subjected to analysis” (Crawford et al., 2014,
p. 1666). That is, might some people be subjected to more
scrutiny than others? Questions of justice must be considered
when the benefits and risks of data collection in a smart city
are unevenly distributed.
One issue with big data is the ability to link specific
information with an identity. However, if an identity is not
associated with information, is it ethical to use this data
for analysis? The answer may vary depending on whether
it serves civil, commercial, or private interest. Civil interest
would include, for example, estimating the number of
people by pinging devices for public transportation in the
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interest of efficiency. This would not link identity, but rather
the number of devices in a specific location.
Commercial interest describes collecting and analyzing
data for a profit motive, which may include using Internet
browsing history and recent purchases to predict what a
user would most likely be interested in. This practice links
an identity to data, which could be deemed unethical
depending whether the practice is transparent and done
with user consent. Ethical dilemmas regarding data analysis
will be raised by smart cities. It is important for the public
to assess the dangers of unethical data usage early on in the
development of smart cities so that policymaking does not
lag too far behind the technological advancement these cities
will bring. Once smart cities are already built, it will be much
more difficult to rethink how they address privacy.

be rules and procedures governing the use and sharing of
data. A state level government agency should oversee data
flow along with issuing these authorizations to ensure local
control in the smart city developing process. Its purpose
would be to inspect and investigate companies suspected of
illegal information practices. This will make data harder to
obtain while also punishing individuals or companies who
mishandle it.
Table 3: Data Priority Tiers

8. Policy Approach

Smart cities are still in the early stages of development. This
means that privacy and security concerns will continue
to arise, but it also means there is an opportunity now to
build smart cities with stakeholders’ interests in mind. The
severity of privacy issues will depend on how smart cities are
governed. In this section, we weigh the best policy scenarios
for a developing smart city.
Smart cities will involve vast amounts of information,
processed by artificial intelligence or people for the sake of
learning individual or societal trends. This information will
be analyzed for a range of purposes, from running more
efficient in-city transportation to supporting company profit
motives (Walker, 2019). Private information, such as one’s
daily routine, hobbies, and interests, could be acquired by
different actors for different purposes. Unlike traditional
urban areas, “smart cities have become data-centric projects
focusing on the constant generation, collection, and
processing of data” (What Are Smart Cities?!, 2008). With
information constantly relaying from device to device, proper
security protocols and management of this information
needs to be regulated by governing entities to ensure privacy
and security for citizens, companies, and governments are
maintained.
There is a growing push to regulate data for privacy purposes.
For example, there is a movement within the United States
“calling on the federal government to create an entirely new
federal agency tasked with data privacy protection” (Krishan,
2019). An approach in the context of smart cities would be
to create mandatory government authorizations to handle
different types of information. Additionally, there should

Note. Adapted from “District of Columbia Data Policy” by Office
of the Mayor, April 27, 2017, (https://octo.dc.gov/sites/default/files/
dc/sites/octo/page_content/attachments/2017-115_District-of-Columbia-Data-Policy.pdf).

Data makes a smart city function. Therefore, it is important
to help the public recognize that not all data has the same level
of sensitivity. To do this, data could be classified into tiers
like those displayed in Table 3. Smart cities might consider
creating data regulatory agencies to oversee this classification
system. As Washington D.C. has done with its dataset
classification levels, higher tiers could correspond to greater
security risks and greater offenses if information is mishandled
or stolen (Office of the Mayor, 2017). For example, Tier 1
could include data not linked to individual identity. The data
regulatory agency might determine that accessing this tier of
data does not need authorization except for specific cases.
de Groot (2019) summarizes three principles for classifying
data: context, content, and user. Context-based classification
looks for sensitive information; content-based classification
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“looks at application, location, or creator,” and user-based
classification “relies on user knowledge and discretion at
creation, edit, review, or dissemination” (de Groot, 2019).
Authorizations to handle this information would be issued
by the data regulatory agency. These authorizations would
ensure proper care for the different types of data and hold
those accountable who use it incorrectly or jeopardize
its privacy/integrity. The agency could also coordinate
inspections to make sure companies and other entities are
complying with proper data protocols.
Predicting the future outcomes of a smart city will steer
development as well. A societal shift concerning the
importance of data must be viewed as an important step
in smart city development. An informed public should be
the first step toward protecting privacy. Smart cities involve
uncertainties which means many legislative decisions may be
made in a reactive manner; however, steps can be taken to
proactively protect privacy at this early stage of development.
This can be done through planning and the construction of
a data governing framework. This should push the citizens
affected by the new framework to better understand the
system and what it means for them.

9. Conclusions

Smart cities prioritize efficient systems over privacy. This will
continue to be the case “as the amount of data gathered via
the IoT continues to grow” (Newman, 2019). Privacy will
always be a major concern in smart cities due to the vast
collection of data through many systems. Many of these
systems link identity with the data. This poses a threat to
privacy and raises questions: Who owns and analyzes this
data, and, as Newman (2019) asked, “At what point does the
data collection become too much?” and “When is privacy
more important than convenience?”
With a society that is constantly connected to a network,
privacy will be a concern due to the prevalence of data
breaches and hackings. Devices constantly collect and
analyze data whether citizens have agreed to it or not. To
implement security practices that ensure data integrity and
confidentiality, a holistic analysis is required to understand
the interconnected systems that collectively comprise a
smart city. If a holistic approach is not taken, many “wellintentioned efforts [could] lead to policy resistance, where
our policies are delayed, diluted, or defeated by unforeseen
reactions” (Sterman, 2000). Additionally, while technical
solutions can address and even anticipate hackers’ security
attacks, only policy planning can control how data will
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collected and design how it will be used.
Complex problems rarely have simple solutions; therefore,
it is important to assess all dimensions of a smart city before
implementing change. It is also important to understand
what these changes might do to the system because none
of the proposed solutions work independently from one
another. They are all a part of the same system to combat the
interference of hacking and the invasion of privacy. Due to
the complex nature of the problem, technical and regulatory
solutions must be devised to work hand in hand to protect
privacy as smart cities progress.
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